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 A Living Constitutional Identity: 
The Contribution of Non-Judicial Actors 
 
Pietro Faraguna* 
Abstract 
 
In federal states, constitutional identity is the glue that holds together the Union. On the 
contrary, in the European Union – not a fully-fledged federation yet – each Member 
state has its own constitutional identity. On the one hand, the Union may benefit from 
the particular knowledge, innovation, history, diversity and culture of its individual 
states. On the other hand, identity-related claims may have a disintegrating effect. Con-
stitutional diversity needs to come to terms with risks of disintegration. The Treaty on 
the European Union seeks a balance, providing the obligation to respect the constitu-
tional identities of its Member states. Drawing from the European experience, this arti-
cle compares judicial and non-judicial means of accommodation of divergent constitu-
tional values. In the category of non-judicial means, political negotiated exemptions and 
opt-outs in favor of certain Member states have been considered. In the category of judi-
cial means of accommodation, this article analyzes how national and supranational 
Courts approach the concept of constitutional identity. This article finds that non-
judicial means of accommodation of identity-related conflicts are a crucial complement 
to judicial ones and – under certain circumstances – a superior alternative. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
1. #Identity: a trending topic?  
Over the last decades, the lexicon of European constitutional scholars has appar-
ently changed. If the interests of EU law scholars could be gauged through Twitter, a 
trending topic would likely be: #identity1. 
It is difficult to explain this development, yet this new trend is unsurprising for a 
number of reasons. Europe is a small continent: the smallest continent in fact. However, 
no other corner of the planet bears such an intensity of difference and contrast2. Com-
pared with the rest of the world, part of Europe's character is the richness which is 
brought by the many different languages spoken, and the many histories and traditions, 
in an area of only half a million square kilometers (smaller than Brazil or Australia, less 
than half the size of China, and equivalent to only a fraction of Russia). 
The rise of identity claims in the European Union over the last two decades is 
perfectly consistent with the development of a long history of national identity in Eu-
rope and its neighboring regions: it is no coincidence that the last remaining multi-
ethnic states in the region – Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the USSR – disappeared 
during the 1990s, to make room for more nationally homogeneous entities. The 1990s 
have seen years of claims to national identity, and the European Union was no exception 
to this trend3. In 1992, ‘national identity’ made it into the Maastricht Treaty.  
The increase of identity claims over the last two decades has been a matter of 
theoretical speculation. With the euro crisis, identity claims have changed from being 
matters of theory to matters of practice. At present, Europe seems to be sitting on a tick-
                                                   
1 In 2005 it had already been noted that “[t]o protect national sovereignty is passé: to protect na-
tional identity by insisting on constitutional specificity is à la mode”: cf. JHH Weiler, ‘On the Power of the 
Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 
184. 
2 These considerations open the formidable history of postwar Europe by Tony Judt, Postwar: A 
History of Europe Since 1945 (Penguin Books 2006). 
3 ibid 637–638. One should say that not all these States were multiethnic (Czechoslovakia was a 
multinational not a multiethnic State) and even if every single dissolution had its own development, the 
territorial fission of the late Nineties was in line with the ethnic “simplification” of the European map. 
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ing time bomb – loaded with identity claims – and this issue is no longer purely theoret-
ical: are Eurobonds compatible with the German constitutional identity? Is the Republic 
of Ireland entitled to prohibit the medical practice of terminating pregnancies, and/or to 
restrict the provision or advertising of this medical service, in the Republic of Ireland, 
when the procedure can be carried out in another Member State? Are the family rights 
of a same sex couple, validly married in France, to be recognized in the Polish legal or-
der? 
This paper will fall short of dealing directly with substantive questions such as 
these, which relate to identity issues. However, I will try to address the precursory ques-
tion of which actor is best placed to answer these crucial questions. Is it the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that should decide upon identity issues? Or 
should the constitutional and supreme courts of Member States be entitled to the final 
word on the subject? I will argue it should be neither. 
In this paper I will question the judicial monopoly over the national constitution-
al identity which has emerged in the development of the European integration process 
in recent decades. To do this, I will begin by analyzing the notion of national constitu-
tional identity from a court-centric perspective (para. 3).  
The paper will offer a brief overview of the meaning of constitutional identity 
found in case-law relating to European integration, in particular some highly influential 
decisions of constitutional courts (para. 4). The paper will then focus on some early de-
cisions of the CJEU, where Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was 
in play, and go on to consider the analysis on the identity clause in Advocate Generals’ 
opinions (para. 5 and 6). On the basis of this case-law, I will argue that national consti-
tutional identity remains a very vague concept. In the following section of the paper, I 
will argue that the indeterminacy of the concept of national constitutional identity in Ar-
ticle 4(2) TEU may not be a flaw within the provision, but one of its most resourceful 
aspects (para. 7). I will elaborate on the interpretation of this notion, moving away from 
the courts. A purely judicial approach to national constitutional identity has not in-
creased our understanding of the concept, and the judicial route has recently illustrated 
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the risk of achieving disastrous results (I refer in particular to the Gauweiler/OMT case, 
see para. 8). In light of this, I will argue that other methods to assess strong national in-
terests exist. These methods need to be developed further and be connected with the ob-
ligation in EU law to “respect national identities” (para. 9). These methods can partly re-
ly on legal arrangements which already exist and which are encapsulated within the 
broad notion of differentiated integration (para. 10). In addition, I will demonstrate that 
differentiated integration has been used to neutralize potential conflicts between EU law 
and “qualified interests” within national legal systems (para. 11). There is empirical evi-
dence in practice of the result of the application of differentiated integration, which I 
will investigate in some detail (in particular, I will look at opt-outs, identity-tailored pro-
tocols and quasi opt-outs, para. 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5). In this part of the analysis, I 
will consider the type and nature of national interests that trigger differentiated integra-
tion, aiming at recognizing possible overlaps with judicial readings of national constitu-
tional identity (para. 12).  
My paper will then address three other areas where a non-judicial understanding 
of national constitutional identity may emerge. They are: a) areas of EU competence 
that remain subject to the rule of unanimity, b) enhanced co-operation agreements, c) 
the position of national Parliaments in the application of the subsidiarity principle. 
 With regard to unanimity (para. 13), I will argue that the reluctance to move from unan-
imous to majority voting in EU-28 may provide a suggestion of there being a mutual 
mistrust between Member States, which fear losing control in certain areas. This may 
indicate (although not prove) that these matters are constitutional-identity-sensitive, 
and that decisions taken in these fields may indirectly affect national constitutional 
identities. As to enhanced cooperation agreements (para. 14), I will examine the two ini-
tial examples put in force. Enhanced cooperation is a mechanism of differentiated inte-
gration which responds to the need to cut certain Member States out of the next phase 
of European integration. My paper will examine whether national concerns of non-
participating Member States can be linked with the notion of national constitutional 
identity. Finally, I will consider the references to national constitutional identity in the 
A Living Constitutional Identity: The Contribution of Non-Judicial Actors 
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reasoned opinions of national Parliaments in the framework of the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity (para. 15).  
To conclude the analysis of this non-judicial route, this paper will compare the 
outcomes of the examined methods for neutralizing possible conflicts with the outcomes 
of the court-centric perspective of interpreting national constitutional identity. We will 
see that remarkable overlap will emerge (para. 16). 
Finally, this paper will adopt a speculative perspective, and I will argue that em-
pirical evidence shows that differentiated integration and flexibility have already being 
used as non-judicial tools to respect (or rather to neutralize future infringements of) na-
tional constitutional identities. This pragmatic, flexible application has stemmed from 
an ever more acute need to differentiate in an expanding European Union (para. 17). On 
the basis of this pragmatic approach, I will argue for an interpretation of Article 4(2) 
TEU that demands a legal obligation to use a wide range of differentiated integration for 
the purpose of respecting national constitutional identities.  
2. Art. 4(2) TEU: national or constitutional identity? 
The Treaty on the European Union refers to ‘national identity’. So, why are the 
shelves of law libraries weighed down by massive amounts of literature on ‘constitution-
al identity’? To cut a long story short, the interpretation of the notion of ‘national identi-
ty’ has gradually shifted towards a legal approach, moving away from a historical or so-
ciological one4. This move has been partly supported, if not caused, by the amendment 
of the Treaty formulation with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty5. Nevertheless, literal 
                                                   
4 Legal scholars arrived relatively late in approaching this trending topic, following other social 
sciences where an interest in nations and nationalism studies came to the fore some years earlier. Among 
many others, see Lutz Niethammer, Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen 
Konjunktur (Rowohlt Taschenbuch 2000). On the delay of the legal scholarship see Elke Cloots, National 
Identity in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 4. 
5 The Maastricht Treaty’s wording narrowly provided that “The Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democra-
cy” (Art. F(1)). The Treaty of Lisbon added that the Union shall respect the equality of the Member States 
as well as their national identities “inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including 
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interpretation seems a blunt instrument in this field, considering the fact that a crucial 
element such as the singular or plural conjugation varies in the Treaty’s translations6. 
Although the concept of identity has always been subject to ambiguities and in-
terpretative uncertainties, the connection between national and constitutional identity 
has gradually been taken for a self-evident truth7. On the contrary, it seems necessary to 
devote some attention to the point8. The Maastricht Treaty represented a sort of water-
shed in the evolution of the legal thought about identity in the EU. On one hand, the 
treaty took important steps in the way of an ever closer European Union, with the intro-
duction of a European citizenship, a deeper economic Union and a monetary Union, and 
an ever closer political Union; these are steps that were able to challenge the traditional 
role of the national State. On the other hand, the fear of a supranational overcoming of 
the national State was balanced by the introduction of principles aimed at safeguarding 
Member States9, such as the principle of respect for national identities10.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national securi-
ty. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State” (Art. 4(2)). 
6 So, in English the Union shall respect national identities, whereas in Italian ‘L’Unione rispetta 
l’identità nazionale’, in German ‘Die Union achtet die nationale Identität’, in French ‘L’Union respecte 
l’identité nationale’ and in Polish ‘Unia szanuje tożsamość narodową’.  
7 On this point an efficient summary is to be found in a relatively recent AG’s opinion: “I would 
make it clear that the position which I propose that the Court should adopt in the present case does not 
mean that account is not to be taken of the national identity of the Member States, of which constitutional 
identity certainly forms a part”, Case C-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni [2012], 
Opinion of  AG Bot, para. 137 
8 On the understanding of national identity as constitutional identity see Roberto Toniatti, ‘Toni-
atti, Sovereignty Lost, Constitutional Identity Regained’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro 
Llivinia (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 62 ff; Leon-
ard FM Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht Law 
Review 36, 42–44. Contra Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citi-
zenship, Culture, and Community (Routledge 2009) 29; Cloots (n 5) 167–168. 
9 On the counterbalancing effect of the identity-clause with respect to “on-going constitutionaliza-
tion of the EU”, see Monica Claes, ‘National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotation?’ in Alejandro 
Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivinia (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integra-
tion (Intersentia 2013) 118. In the same sense see also Cloots (n 5) 63, 82, 179, 184. 
10 See Art. F of the Maastricht Treaty, the first provision in a European Treaty which explicitly 
mentioned national identity: “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose 
system of government are founded on the principles of democracy”. 
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In the EU a process of balancing between new national claims and integrationist 
forces continued in the successive amendments of the Treaties11, through some minor 
changes in the formulation of the principle of protection of national identities and – 
above all – through the introduction of the subsidiarity principle12. 
If the Treaty of Maastricht brought a vast attention to the concept of national 
identity, the Lisbon Treaty was a successive landmark in the evolution of the identity lit-
erature. Art. 4(2) was the first EU Treaty provision to codify national constitutional 
identity, through a reformulation of the identity clause which was largely drawing from 
the text of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty. For the first time the wording shifted from 
the purely national qualification of identity to a much wider one. (National) identity is 
now inherent in Member States’ “fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government”13. The textual evolution of the clause en-
compassed the inclusion of equality of Member States in the same Art. 4(2) TEU. 
Among the innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of identity, one should moreo-
ver mention the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU), establishing the obligation to respect the “national identities of the Member 
States and the organization of their public authorities at national, regional and local lev-
els”. 
Against this background, it was quite clear that the concept of national identity 
consisted not only of a mere historical or sociological reference, but, on the contrary, 
                                                   
11 The treaty of Amsterdam reformulated the principles, splitting the democratic principle and the 
protection of national identities. The democratic principle was formulated in a separated paragraph, as a 
fundamental principle both of the Member States and the Union: “The Union is founded on the principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member States”. The obligation of the Union to respect the national identities 
was formulated in the third paragraph of the same article: “The Union shall respect the national identities 
of its Member States”. 
12 On the role of Subsidiarity (then beside the dismantled pillar system and the “variable geome-
try” approach of closer cooperation) in these conflicts between European and national sovereignty claims 
see Peter L Lindseth, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The 
Example of the European Community’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 628, 668 ff. 
13 Art. 4(2) TEU. 
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bore a legal meaning and more precisely a constitutional one14. It comes as no surprise 
that this constitutionalization of the concept of identity triggered an even deeper in-
volvement of the constitutional courts in many Member States. A number of judgments 
had already been pronounced on the matter when the Treaty of Maastricht was adopted. 
Nonetheless, the outbreak of such judgments on the matter of constitutional identity af-
ter Maastricht and above all after Lisbon has been remarkable.  
One could argue that these decisions have nothing to do with Article 4(2) TEU 
and with the autonomous notion of national identity in EU law. As a matter of fact, the 
Treaties’ wording does not refer to constitutional identity, but to national identity, and a 
literal understanding of the identity clause would not allow any correspondence with the 
domestic notion of constitutional identity. Accordingly, one should interpret the legal 
meaning of ‘nation’, to determine the authentic understanding of the identity clause in 
Art. 4(2) TEU. This reasoning would not lead very far: the very concept of ‘nation’ is 
highly controversial as well as subject to ambiguities, vagueness, and indeterminacy. 
There are at least two, radically different, understandings of this notion in the history of 
the legal thought in the last two centuries. According to the ethnic-centered reading of 
the nation, the concept is related to the existence of common elements in a community: 
language, history, customs, if not blood and ethnicity. In contrast with this view, the civ-
ic conception of nation identifies the notion with a subjective sense of belonging to a 
community, based on very different elements, such as citizenship, law, culture, religion. 
Additionally, a narrow interpretation of the concept of ‘national identity’ would not be 
able to embrace the reality of the many multinational Member States in the EU15. In par-
ticular if the singular declination of ‘national identity’ would be taken into consideration 
under this narrow interpretation, what about the Member States comprising multina-
                                                   
14 The reference to fundamental political and constitutional structures “distances the notion of na-
tional identity in Article 4(2) TEU from cultural, historical or linguistic criteria and turns to the content of 
domestic constitutional orders”. See Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Pri-
macy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011101) 48 Common Market Law Review 
1417, 1427. 
15 Besselink (n 9) 42–43. 
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tional identities? A “pure national” interpretation of the notion of “national identity” 
would lead to a complex legal puzzle16. 
As a matter of fact, the self-understanding in a community of the proper meaning 
of nation can greatly vary and, most importantly, “the content of what constitutes na-
tional identity … is determined by reference to domestic constitutional law”17. This 
brings us back to the broader notion of “national constitutional identity”. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW 
3. A court-centered canon 
Art. 4(2) TEU has been frequently described as a “Europeanized counter-limit”18, 
consisting of a binding obligation for the EU to respect national constitutional identities. 
The interpretation of the extension and implications of this obligation as a matter of 
positive law is crucial with respect to two of the most fundamental principles of the Eu-
ropean constitutional order, such as primacy and uniform application of EU law. There-
fore it is not surprising that vast attention has been devoted to the judicial interpretation 
of the legal meaning and scope of the abovementioned provision.  
The identity clause has been seen as a twofold “invitation to struggle”19: on one 
hand the struggle involves the interpretation of the identity clause. On the other, it af-
                                                   
16 See on this point Cloots (n 5) 151–154. 
17 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 15) 1429. 
18 Giuseppe Martinico, The Tangled Complexity of the EU Constitutional Process: The Frustrat-
ing Knot of Europe (Routledge 2012) 89 ff; Antonio Ruggeri, ‘“Tradizioni Costituzionali Comuni” E “Con-
trolimiti”, Tra Teoria Delle Fonti E Teoria Dell" Interpretazione’ 2003 Diritto pubblico comparato ed eu-
ropeo 102. According to Dobbs “therefore, the conflict is no longer technically between national and EU 
law, but between aspects of EU law”, see Mary Dobbs, ‘Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of 
National Identities: Swinging the Balance in Favour of the Member States?’ [2014] Yearbook of European 
Law 1, 28. 
19 An “invitation to struggle” for the direction of foreign and security policy is the image used by 
Corwin to describe the US constitution and its distribution of powers between the President and Con-
gress: see Edward S Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 5th Edition (5 edition, NYU Press 1984) 
177. 
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fects the definition of the competent authority in charge of the interpretation20. Invited 
or not, national and supra-national Courts struggle. 
A court-centered interpretative canon of the identity clause has supported an “ex-
ceptionalist understanding”21 of Art. 4(2) TEU. The identity argument has been seen as 
a last resort “to only apply in exceptional cases of conflict between EU law and domestic 
constitutional law”22. This is certainly true as far as the judicial use of national constitu-
tional identity is concerned. As a matter of fact, consequences of the application of Art. 
4(2) TEU to justify a relativization of the EU law primacy are difficult to predict, and 
preferable to avoid.  
4. National constitutional identity in the case-law of the Member States’ 
constitutional courts 
Although the very first judgment where a national Court theorized domestic con-
stitutional reservations to the primacy of EU law is the Frontini Judgment23 of the Ital-
ian Constitutional court, it is without doubt that the counter-limits case-law of the Ger-
man Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) played a major role in this matter24. 
The example and model of the German BVerfG counter-limits doctrine has been 
subject to a quick evolution. The counter-limits’ doctrine initially consisted of a human 
rights proviso (Solange), then turned into an ultra vires test (Maastricht) and finally in-
to a constitutional identity test (Lisbon)25. 
                                                   
20 See Kumm, “The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict” and Toniatti (n 9) 68. 
21 The term is drawn from Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional 
Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause’ (2012) 12 Jean Monnet Working Paper 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/12/documents/JMWP01Guastaferro.pdf>. 
22 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 15) 1431. 
23 Corte costituzionale, judgement no. 183 of 1973. The Italian Constitutional Court did not explic-
itly make use of the term ‘identity’, but followed a very similar approach to the Solange saga.  
24 This role has been boosted by the “overwhelming academic and political attention on the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht’s pronouncements on EU law” and this attention “risks putting the case law of oth-
er national constitutional courts in the shade”: see Cloots (n 5) 52. 
25 Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell. Contextualizing the Re-
lationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review 9. 
A Living Constitutional Identity: The Contribution of Non-Judicial Actors 
 
 13   
The (in)famous role of the BVerfG as a stringent watchdog of the State-centered 
constitutional model was inaugurated with the Solange I judgment in 1974, and passed 
through a series of landmark decisions (Solange II, Maastricht, Banana Market Deci-
sion, Lisbon, Mangold-Honeywell, Euro Crisis, OMT), vastly commented on in the con-
stitutional and EU law literature. Assessing this case-law in detail would take us too far 
from the focus of this paper. Briefly, with regard to this German “obsession”26, what 
should be noticed is the fact that the BVerfG played a crucial role in interpreting the is-
sues related with national constitutional identities.  
This model implies that constitutional identity consists of a core that is not sub-
ject to any modification. This constitutional core sets a limit to European integration 
that not even a constitutional amendment may remove. The content of this core is en-
shrined in the so called ‘eternity clause’ in accordance with Art. 79.3 GG, which was ex-
tended to the European matters pursuant to Art. 23 GG and further interpreted by the 
BVerfG itself. Hence, within the constitutional core, the eternity clause includes the 
principle of democracy, the essence of which consists in the constitutional voting rights 
of German citizens. Against this background, the BVerfG states that the German Fun-
damental Law impedes the conferral of those competences to the EU that would bear a 
risk of deprivation of the right to vote and the principle of democracy of their substan-
tive contents. In the view of the BVerfG: 
“Particularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional 
state to democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive 
and formal criminal law (1), on the disposition of the monopoly on 
the use of force by the police within the state and by the military 
towards the exterior (2), fundamental fiscal decisions on public 
revenue and public expenditure, the latter being particularly mo-
                                                   
26 The protection of national identity lies in between an “obsession” and a “serious concern” in the 
words of Tomuschat, “The Defence of National Identity by the German Constitutional Court”, in 
Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivinia, National Constitutional Identity and European In-
tegration (Intersentia 2013) 205. 
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tivated, inter alia, by social policy considerations (3), decisions on 
the shaping of living conditions in a social state (4) and decisions 
of particular cultural importance, for example on family law, the 
school and education system and on dealing with religious com-
munities (5) and the right of coinage (6) ”27 
 
This model has proved successful, and was the object of a wide migration of a 
persuasive “constitutional idea”28. As a matter of fact, the EU-related case-law of many 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts – Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic – bear re-
semblances to the BVerfG’s doctrine of constitutional identity. In some cases these re-
semblances are made explicit, with open references to the Lissabon Urteil of the 
BVerfG. This is the case of the Polish Constitutional Court’s decision on the Treaty of 
Lisbon, manifestly inspired by the German model. According to the Constitutional 
Courts’ view, the constitutional rule concerning the transfer of competences (Art. 90 of 
the Polish Constitution) protects Poland’s constitutional identity, by excluding from the 
transfer the matters that are fundamental for the organization of a State. These are the 
decisions concerning the fundamental principles of the constitution, the fundamental 
rights, the principle of statehood, the democratic principle, the rule of law, the welfare 
state, subsidiarity and the competence to amend the constitution itself.  
Additionally, the Polish Constitutional Court made it clear that the concept of 
constitutional identity is an equivalent of – or at least is very closely related with – the 
concept of national identity, which also includes the tradition and culture, drawing its 
interpretation not only from Art. 4(2) TEU, but also from the preamble of the Treaty on 
European Union, where one of the indicated objectives of the Union is to deepen the sol-
idarity between the peoples of the Union while respecting their history, culture and tra-
ditions. In this respect, according to the Polish Constitutional Court’s view, “the idea of 
                                                   
27 BVerfG, 2/08, Judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267 ff. The right of coinage – that has 
always been a classical state competence in traditional theoretical models – was not mentioned in the 
Court’s list of the hardcore of Member State competence, and the reason of this omission is quite clear.  
28 Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Reissue edition, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2011). 
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confirming one’s national identity in solidarity with other nations, and not against them, 
constitutes the main axiological basis of the European Union”29. 
The Hungarian Court case-law too bears resemblances with the Lissabon-Urteil 
of the BVerfG, although there are no explicit references to the judgment of the German 
colleagues. In its decision on the compatibility of the act of promulgation of the Lisbon 
Treaty with the Constitution, the Hungarian judges rejected an individual complaint, 
but affirmed that the Parliament has an obligation to reconcile the commitment derived 
from Hungary’s membership in the EU and the observance of the Constitution30. 
The position of the Czech Constitutional Court is rather more open toward Euro-
pean law31, but has some similarities to the German saga. The Court acknowledges the 
principle of an EU-conforming interpretation of constitutional law, but in case of a con-
flict between EU law and the Czech constitution – specially its “material core”32 – the 
latter must prevail33. Unlike the BVerfG, the Czech Court does not consider it possible, 
in view of the position that it holds in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, to 
create a catalogue of non-transferrable powers and authoritatively determine “substan-
tive limits to the transfer of powers”34. According to the Czech Court’s view, this is not 
the Constitutional Court’s task. Limits to the transfer of powers exist, but these “should 
                                                   
29 Constitutional Court of Poland, Judgement of 11 November 2010, (K 32/09), Treaty of Lisbon, 
23. An English version is available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_calosc.pdf. 
30 Hungarian CC, Judgement of 12 July 2010, No. 143/2010. 
31 For a general and up-to-date overview on the relation between the Czech Constitution and EU 
integration, see Lubos Tichy and Tomas Dumbrovsky, ‘The Czech Constitution and EU Integration’ (So-
cial Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2615617 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2615617> accessed 20 July 2015. 
32 The identification of the “material core” of the Czech Constitution came to the fore not only 
with respect to EU law, but also in the internal forum, with the declaration of unconstitutionality of a con-
stitutional amendment. See Czech Constitutional Court 2009/09/10, Case Pl ÚS 27/09, Constitutional 
Act on Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies. An English translation of the judgment 
is available at: <www. concourt.cz/clanek/pl-27-09>. On the identification of the “material core”, cf. 
Yaniv Roznai, ‘Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Con-
stitutional Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act’ (2014) 8 Vienna Journal on Inter-
national Constitutional Law 29. 
33 Polish CC Lisbon I, Judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÙS 50/04. 
34 Czech Constitutional Court, case Pl ÚS 20/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 3 November 
2009, § 110. The English translation is available at usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5 
D=466&cHash=eedba7ca14d226b879ccaf91a6dcb2 
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be left primarily to the legislature to specify. This is due to its being, a priori, a political 
question, which provides the legislature wide discretion”35. The gap between the Czech 
Constitutional Court and the BVerfG enlightens a crucial point. Both in the Czech and in 
the German judicial approach to the protection of the national role of the Constitution, 
substantive limits to the transfer of power exist. In the case of the BVerfG, these limits 
may be directly interpreted by the Constitutional Tribunal, entrusted both to write a list 
of non-transferable duties and to review the possible violations of these limits. In the 
case of the Czech constitutional system, the mere existence of substantive limits to the 
transfer of competence is ascertained by the Constitutional Court: the concrete individ-
uation of these limits is left open to future developments, where the role of the Court 
cannot be excluded, even though the Czech Court keeps for itself a higher degree of flex-
ibility. 
This approach is clearly in favor of the political process, and it gets the Czech 
Court’s view closer to the French approach than to the German one. In the framework of 
an ex ante review (Art. 54 of the French Constitution), the Conseil Constitutionnel re-
viewed the compatibility of both the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon with 
the French Constitution. In both cases the Conseil deemed a constitutional revision nec-
essary in view of the ratification of the Treaties. In a few words, the Conseil ascertained 
some constitutional limits in respect to certain provisions of the Treaty, but the nature 
of the domestic limits is merely formal36. In these cases, the Conseil did not declare sub-
stantive limits to the development of European integration, but deemed necessary the 
revision of the French Constitution to admit the entry into force of certain new provi-
sions of the Treaties (such as the conferral of new competences to the EU, the introduc-
tion of supranational modes of decision-making, the introduction of the general bridge 
clause in accordance with Art. 48.7 TUE and with the new powers conferred to national 
                                                   
35 Ibid. 
36 See among many others Jean-Philippe Derosier, Les limites constitutionnelles à l’intégration 
européenne: étude comparée: Allemagne, France, Italie (LGDJ 2015). 
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Parliaments under EU law). The discussion shifted back to the political spectrum, and 
the Parliament promptly reacted with the necessary constitutional amendments37.  
The French path may be seen as the opposite and alternative model to the Ger-
man BVerfG position38. Unlike the German judges, the Conseil Constitutionnel defers a 
much wider margin of discretion for the political actors to set the constitutional limits to 
the future development of European integration. The Conseil role has been limited to 
ascertain if a prior revision of the Constitution was necessary in case of ratification of 
new Treaties that provided clauses running counter the Constitution. As far as the con-
stitutional identity was concerned, a landmark decision of the Conseil was pronounced 
in 2006. In a nutshell39, the Conseil held that the obligation to implement EU secondary 
law only encountered limits in a principle “inherent in the constitutional identity of 
France, except when the constituting power consents thereto”40. What is to be included 
in the “constitutional identity of France” is not clear at all, but this notion “relates to 
what is not shared with other States, to what is specific of France”41. 
                                                   
37 See the constitutional laws no 2005-204, 1 March 2005 (with regard to the Constitutional Trea-
ty) and no 2008-103, 4 February 2008 (with regard to the Lisbon Treaty). 
38 For wide analysis of this “relatively cooperative strategy”, see Francois Xavier Millet, L’Union 
Européenne et l’identité constitutionnelle des Etats membres (Lgdj 2013) 25–46. Additionally, on the 
French experience, see Martin Quesnel, La Protection de L’identité Constitutionnelle de La France (Dal-
loz 2015).  
39 For a broad analysis, see Marie-Luce Paris, ‘Europeanization and Constitutionalization: The 
Challenging Impact of a Double Transformative Process on French Law’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European 
Law 21. 
40 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision no. 2006-540 DC, 27 July 2006, para. 19 (an official English 
translation is available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/ 
download/2006540DCen2006_540dc.pdf). 
41 See Claes (n 10) 127., referring  to the official comment of the Commissaire du government 
Gyonmar of the Conseil d’État published in Les Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel no. 17, p. 28-29. Some 
commentator proposed the ‘principe de laïcité’ and the social character of France as part of this peculiarly 
French constitutional identity: See ‘Commentaire de La Décision N° 2008-564 DC – 19 Juin 2008’ (2008) 
25 Les Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2008564DCccc_564dc.pdf>; Selma Josso, ‘Le Caractère Social de 
La République, Principe Inhérent à L’identité Constitutionnelle de La France?’ (2008) 
<http://www.droitconstitutionnel.org/congresParis/comC1/JossoTXT.pdf>. 
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5. National constitutional identity in the case-law of the CJEU 
National identity made it into the Treaties since 1992, under the formulation of 
Article F(1) of the Maastricht Treaty, but it became subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice only after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty42. Nevertheless the 
(then) European Court of Justice (ECJ) made reference to the notion of national identity 
also before the entry into force of the latter Treaty. 
Surprisingly, many cases that are often referred to as milestones of the ECJ’s 
case-law in matter of national identity – such as Omega43, Portugal v Commission (re 
Azores)44 or Gibraltar45 – do not mention Article F(1), nor the successive numbering of 
the identity clause (Art. 6 and Art. 4(2) TEU). In some of these cases the principle at 
stake was the recognition and respect of diversity among constitutional systems of 
Member States, without any reference to national or constitutional identity46.  
However, an explicit reference to ‘national identity and culture’ emerges in the 
ECJ’s case law already before the adoption of Article F(1) in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The first explicit reference emerges already in the Groener judgment in 198947. The case 
dealt with the denial of an appointment as a teacher in Ireland for a Dutch citizen, be-
cause of her failure in an Irish language test. In its decision the ECJ found that the pro-
visions of the EC Treaty do not go against the adoption of a policy seeking the protection 
                                                   
42 Article 46 TEU pre-Lisbon outlined the boundaries of the CJEU’s jurisdiction with a positive 
list of reviewable provisions that did not include the provision on national identity. On this point see 
Dobbs (n 19) 3; Leonard FM Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional Identity in the European Union: An Es-
say on ECJ (Second Chamber), Case C 208/09, 22 December 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landes-
hauptmann von Wien’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 671, 678; Monica Claes, ‘Negotiating Con-
stitutional Identity or Whose Identity Is It Anyway?’ in Monica Claes and others (eds), Constitutional 
Conversations in Europe, vol 107 217. On the other hand, other authors noted that this “scholarly fixation 
on the fact that identity clause was not formally included in the Court’s jurisdiction as an explanation for 
why the ECJ did not explicitly seek guidance from the clause when interpreting or reviewing community 
legislation seems exaggerated”: see Cloots (n 5) 165. 
43 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004]. 
44 Case C-88/03 Portugal v. Commission [2006]. 
45 Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006]. 
46 Despite this fact, many comments considered these cases “among the most illustrious examples 
of the Court’s ‘silent’ sensitivity to domestic constitutional provisions inspired by national identity”: see 
Cloots (n 5) 7. 
47 Case C-379/87 Anita Groener and The Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Voca-
tional Education Committee [1989]. 
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and promotion of the language of a Member State (both the national and official lan-
guage) “as a means of expressing national and cultural identity”48. 
The Groener case can be held as a sort of ancestor of the much more recent Run-
evič judgment. The case concerned a dispute regarding the spelling of foreign names in 
Lithuania. A Lithuanian citizen of Polish origin wanted her name to be registered under 
the Polish spelling rules (“Małgorzata Runiewicz Wardyn”), but the Vilnius Civil registry 
refused her request, on the ground that only surnames and forenames in a form which 
complies with the spelling rules of the official national language may be registered. The 
ECJ argued that the spelling restriction did not constitute a restriction of the right of 
free movement, and partly based its reasoning on the fact that the provisions of EU law 
do not preclude the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language 
of a Member State, which is both the national language and the first official language. 
The ECJ referred to Groener, inevitably enriching its reference with normative coordi-
nates that occurred after Groener. In this respect, the Court stated that “[a]ccording to 
the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the European Union, the Union must respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity. Article 4(2) EU provides that the Union must also respect the national identity 
of its Member States, which includes protection of a State’s official national language”49. 
The spelling of names was also the subject-matter of a previous case, the first one 
carried out after the entry into force of Article 4(2) TEU. The case concerned an Austri-
an constitutional law prohibiting the use of surnames indicating a title of nobility. This 
impeded an Austrian citizen who had resided in Germany for 15 years and had been 
adopted by a German citizen, acquiring the surname of her adoptive father, to use her 
full name “Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein” and, according to Austrian authorities, re-
quired its amendment in “Sayn-Wittgenstein”. 
                                                   
48 Ibid, para 18. 
49 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto sa-
vivaldybės administracija, Lietuvos Respublikos teisingumo ministerija, Valstybinė lietuvių kalbos 
komisija, Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracijos Teisės departamento Civilinės metrikacijos skyr-
ius [2011], para 86. 
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The applicant affirmed that a modification of her name damaged her professional 
activity, since she was known in her sector (luxury real estate) under the previous full 
name. Therefore, the applicant alleged that her freedom of movement and residence was 
restricted by the application to her name of the Austrian constitutional law. The Austri-
an Government contended that the constitutional law in question reflected the principle 
of equality and is intended to protect the constitutional identity of the Republic of Aus-
tria. The Court’s reaction on this point was welcoming, noting that “[i]n that regard, it 
must be accepted that, in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the 
abolition of the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be taken into considera-
tion when a balance is struck between legitimate interests and the right of free move-
ment of persons recognized under European Union law”50. The ECJ expressly acknowl-
edged that national identities under Article 4(2) TEU “include the status of the State as a 
Republic”51. However, national identity was used by the ECJ only as a supporting argu-
ment, since the reasoning of the Court was mainly based on the existence of a legitimate 
restriction. According to the case-law of the Court “[a]n obstacle to the freedom of 
movement of persons can be justified only where it is based on objective considerations 
and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions”52. In the spe-
cific case the Court held that the national provisions were not disproportionate to the le-
gitimate objective53. 
6. National constitutional identity in AG’s opinions  
The brief overview of the CJEU’s decisions related to national constitutional 
identity would give a partial picture of the judicial understanding of the notion, were the 
opinions of the Advocate General (AG) not taken into account. AGs showed, indeed, a 
                                                   
50 Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010], para 83. 
51 Ibid. at para 92. 
52 Ibid at para 81. 
53  In the Court’s words “the Austrian authorities responsible for civil status matters do not appear 
to have gone further than is necessary in order to ensure the attainment of the fundamental constitutional 
objective pursued by them” (§ 93). 
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strong inclination toward the notion of national identity54. In the case Spain v Eurojust 
a reference to the former Article 6(3) TEU and Article 22 of the CFREU is made with re-
gard to linguistic diversity, being the latter “a specific expression constituting the plural-
ity inherent in the European Union”55. In Marrosu and Sardino, constitutional re-
quirements were invoked by the Italian Government as the legal basis for a Member 
State (Italy, in that case) to prevent some unjustified fixed-term employment relation-
ships from being converted into permanent contracts of indefinite duration. In his Opin-
ion, the AG recognized that “national authorities, in particular the constitutional courts, 
should be given the responsibility to define the nature of the specific national features 
that could justify such a difference in treatment. Those authorities are best placed to de-
fine the constitutional identity of the Member States which the European Union has un-
dertaken to respect”56. 
An explicit reference to the constitutional understanding of national identity may 
be found in the Opinion of AG Kokott in the UGT Rioja case. Firstly, it is recalled that 
under Article 6(3) EU the European Union must respect the national identities of its 
Member States. Secondly, AG Kokott interprets this clause as it means “that the Union 
cannot encroach on the constitutional order of a Member State, whether it is centralist 
or federal, and does not in principle have any influence on the division of competences 
within a Member State”. Finally, a reference to the revision of that provision by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, with an explicit intention of the Union to respect the constitutional 
structures of Member States, supports the constitutional understanding of the identity 
                                                   
54 According to a well-informed author, “[t]he ‘objective defenders of law’ are indeed ‘identity lov-
ers’”: see Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘A Huron at the Kirchberg Plateau or a Few Naive Thoughts on 
Constitutional Identity in the Case-Law of the Judge of the European Union’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and 
Carina Alcoberro Llivinia (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 
2013) 284. In his study, Burgorgue-Larsen gives evidence of the higher number of references to constitu-
tional and national identity in the AGs’ opinions than the number of references in ECJ’s judgments. 
55 Case C-160/03 Kingdom of Spain v Eurojust [2005], Opinion of AG Maduro, para 35. 
56 Case C-53/04 Cristiano Marrosu and Gianluca Sardino v Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale San 
Martino di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate [2006] Opinion of AG Maduro, para 40. 
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clause. The same AG referred to the former Article 6(3) in the UTECA case, with regard 
to “respect for and promotion of the diversity of its cultures”57. 
In 2008 AG Maduro delivered his much-quoted opinion in the Michaniki case, by 
far the most important judicial Manifesto on the history and function of the identity-
clause. The case dealt with the Article 13, par. 9 of the Greek Constitution. This provi-
sion excluded tenderers involved in the media sector from participating in public pro-
curement contracts, and provided a sort of presumption of incompatibility between me-
dia sector agents and public tenderers, with the purpose of ensuring equal treatment 
and transparency. AG Maduro recognized that “constitutional identity of the Member 
States can thus constitute a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction 
of the obligations imposed by Community law”58. In fact, according to the AG’s view, the 
Greek legislation exceeded what was necessary so as to observe equal treatment, and 
therefore did not satisfy the requirement of the principle of proportionality. 
In June 2009 AG Colomer’s released in the Umweltanwalt von Kärnten case59, 
where the obligation to respect national identities plays a role in the identification of na-
tional authorities that are entitled to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling. Ac-
cording to Colomier’s opinion, “[i]f a Member State allocates judicial duties to quasi-
judicial bodies and confirms that allocation when such a body is established, that is an 
expression of will closely linked to national identity and national constitutional autono-
my. An expression the Court must respect. Accordingly, Article 234 EC provides for a 
communication channel with national authorities which constitutionally have the pow-
er to dispense justice. In some Member States that role is entrusted exclusively to the 
judiciary while in others it is divided between a number of bodies, in a lawful configura-
tion of institutional organization which Community law does not question”60. 
                                                   
57 Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) [2008], Opinion of AG 
Kokott, para 93. 
58 Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis Ipourgos Epikratias Elliniki 
Technodomiki (TEVAE), formerly Pantechniki AE Sindesmos Epikhiriseon Periodikou Tipou [2008], 
Opinion of AG Maduro, para 33 
59 Case C-205/08 Umweltanwalt von Kärnten and Alpe Adria Energia SpA [2009], Opinion of 
AG Colomber. 
60 Ibid. 
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In 2012 AG Bot delivered an important opinion in the case Melloni, which was 
submitted to the Court with the first preliminary reference by the Spanish Constitution-
al Court. The case concerned a European arrest warrant issued by Italy against Melloni 
(Italian citizen), who was sentenced in absentia before an Italian judge. Melloni chal-
lenged the case before the Constitutional Court of Spain, arguing that the sentence is-
sued in Italy encroached upon his right to a fair trial. AG Bot affirmed that in principle a 
“Member State which considers that a provision of secondary law adversely affects its 
national identity may therefore challenge it on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU”61, but that 
Melloni case did not face this situation. According to the AG’s view, “the participation of 
the defendant at his trial is not covered by the concept of the national identity of the 
Kingdom of Spain”62. AG Bot finally discerned between the protection of a fundamental 
right and the application of Article 4(2) TEU, namely the respect of national identity or, 
more specifically, the constitutional identity of a Member State. 
Finally, in January 2015 AG Cruz Villalón released his opinion on the case Gau-
weiler. The case was about the financial operations of the European Central Bank and 
its importance derived also from the fact that the case had been promoted with the first 
reference for a preliminary ruling from the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. In its 
decision, the German Tribunal had flatly rejected any bridging function between the 
German Fundamental Law and EU law of Article 4(2) TEU, noting that «the identity re-
view performed by the Federal Constitutional Court is fundamentally different from the 
review under Art 4 (2) sentence 1 TEU by the Court of Justice of the European Union»63. 
AG Cruz Villalón devoted a significant paragraph of his opinion to this point. He noted 
that it seems “an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it 
is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discre-
tion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described as ‘con-
                                                   
61 Case C-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni [2012], Opinion of AG Bot, para. 
139. 
62 Ibid., para 140. 
63 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 par 27 
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stitutional identity’. That is particularly the case if that ‘constitutional identity’ is stated 
to be different from the ‘national identity’ referred to in Article 4(2) TEU”64. According 
the AG’s opinion, this would lead EU law towards an unacceptable subordinate position 
and would moreover neglect the hard work done to reconcile EU law with the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States. An alternative approach is possible, on 
Cruz Villalón’s account, and would consist in “a clearly understood, open, attitude to EU 
law” that “should in the medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to basic conver-
gence between the constitutional identity of the Union and that of each of the Member 
States”65. 
7. Art. 4(2) TEU: an “incomplete contract” 
Despite the vast attention devoted to Art. 4(2) TEU by the legal scholarship, the 
very notion of constitutional identity remains quite unclear. ‘Ambiguity’ is one of the ad-
jectives that are more frequently associated with the concept of national and constitu-
tional identity66. This seems to be the fate of every notion of identity, being “an essen-
tially contested concept as there is no agreement over what it means or refers to”67. The 
controversial nature of identity challenges constitutional theorists, whose interests have 
been mostly focused on the reduction of the ambiguity of the concept68. One could none-
theless argue that a certain degree of indeterminacy of the notion may have a positive ef-
fect of the constitutional system. The European Union represents an innovative model, 
and innovation always brings about risks and unpredictable developments. Against this 
background, loose concepts may play the role of a safety valve, and avoid ultimate con-
stitutional crashes. Such an experience is not uncommon in the constitutional develop-
                                                   
64 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et alii v German Bundestag [2015], Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para 
59.  
65 Ibidem, para 61. 
66 Among many others, see Constance Grewe and Joël Rideau, L’Identité Constitutionnelle Des 
états Membres de l’Union Européenne: Flash Back Sur Le Coming-out D’un Concept Ambigu (Dalloz 
2010); Dobbs (n 19) 9; Cloots (n 5) 137. 
67 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitu-
tional Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 756. 
68 Among many others, see the prominent works of Rosenfeld (n 9). and Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, 
Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press 2010).  
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ments of pluralistic polities. Ambiguity may be the optimal trade-off to neutralize pre-
cise disagreements, which are invisible in the formulation of constitutional principles 
that are general enough to welcome very different readings and understandings. This 
praxis is familiar in the post-war constitutional experience. Disagreements are settled 
through “incompletely theorized agreement”, to use the language of Cass Sunstein69, or 
“irregular contracts”, using the language of transaction-cost economics. The use of these 
theoretical “tricks” blunts or at least delays potential conflicts; insofar the formulation of 
the agreed principles is broad enough to welcome all different interpretations preferred 
by the negotiators. 
Empirical evidence of an identity-disagreement may be found in analysis of the 
working documents of the European Convention, dealing with the provision set out in 
the Art. I-5 of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty (CT). Indeed, the current formulation of 
Art. 4(2) TEU is built exactly on the same wording of the so-called Christophersen-
clause of the CT. Therefore the travaux préparatoires of the European Convention are a 
meaningful source to elaborate on the details of the above mentioned misunderstand-
ing70.  
As a matter of fact, a cleavage emerged between the Member States’ representa-
tives and the European Commission’s ones in the proceedings of the working group V, 
chaired by Mr. Hennig Christophersen. The working group mandate dealt with a clearer 
delimitation of competence between the EU and the Member States, but formally cov-
ered the narrower issue of a better definition and regulation of complementary compe-
tences in the CT. Among the members of the working group, both Members States’ and 
the Commission’s representatives shared one common concern, namely the necessity to 
contain EU competence creep. The means to be used to address this shared concern 
were nonetheless subject to a deep disagreement. The Member States’ main worry was 
                                                   
69 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements’ (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 1733. 
70 See Guastaferro (n 22). It has been noted that “expediency and self-interest seem to be what 
motivated the drafters” and that “politics rather than principle lay at the root of the identity clause’s in-
corporation into the Treaties”: see Cloots (n 5) 82–83.  
  26  
the “delimitation of the EU scope of action vis-à-vis those of the Member States”71. Some 
of the proposals of the Member States’ representative drew on the Lamossoure Report72 
of the European Parliament, where the problem of the distribution of competences be-
tween the EU and the Member States had been addressed through a tripartite classifica-
tion: a) competences of the EU; b) exclusive competence of the Member States and c) 
EU’s and Member States’ shared competences (concurrent and complementary). 
In the Member States’ representative views, the delimitation of the EU compe-
tence was the main concern of working group V. Conversely, the Commission represent-
atives focused much more on other aspects, namely the specification of the scale of in-
tervention and the exercise of EU action. A catalogue of Member States’ exclusive com-
petences, possibly bearing the core of Member States’ constitutional identity in the Lis-
sabon-Urteil manner, was therefore incompatible with the Commission’s view. Accord-
ing to the latter, a classification of competences was far too rigid and simplistic73. 
The Member States interpreted the Cristophersen clause exactly as the Commis-
sion was not disposed to do, and thus as a sort of competence clause protecting Member 
States’ powers under the guise of respect of national identities. The terms of the disa-
greement were rather clear in the position of the Commission, where it was clarified that 
an identity clause ought “not lead to the limitation of the scope and exercise of the com-
petencies allocated to the Union to take account of the specific requirements of each 
Member State, for this would jeopardize the distribution of competencies established by 
the Treaty”74.  
                                                   
71 Guastaferro (n 22) 18. [emphasis in the original] 
72 European Parliament – Committee on Constitutional Affairs (24 April 2002), Report on the di-
vision of competences between the EU and the Member States (2001/2024(INI)), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2002-
0133+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
73 “It was quite clear that in the Commission’s view – much more defensive of the status quo – 
there was no space for any explicit or more nuanced enumeration of Member States’ reserved powers – 
what the “Christophersen clause” actually represented for the Member States’ Representative”: see the 
wide analysis of the travaux préparatoires with regard to the identity clause by Guastaferro (n 22) 24. 
74 Working Group V European Convention, ‘Note from M. Paolo PONZANO, Commission’s Rep-
resentative  “Combining Clarity and Flexibility in the European Union”s System of Competencies"’ 5 
<http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/3134.pdf>. 
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On the other side of the fence, Member States were reluctant to openly claim for 
the introduction of national exclusive competences because this could have implied that 
the sovereign authority allocating competences was the Union. This approach would 
have been clearly inconsistent with the jealously preserved idea of the Member States as 
masters of the Treaties and the principal of conferral.  
In summary: the Commission refused the idea of the identity-clause as “counter-
limits’ clause” in the sense of the BVerfG’s Lissabon-doctrine; the Member States’ repre-
sentative interpreted the clause as a sort of list of Member States’ reserved powers, even 
if they were reluctant to the idea of introducing such an enumeration of powers in the 
CT. 
The final wording of the Christophersen-clause (now Art. 4(2) TEU, with the ad-
dition of a final sentence) did not draw any list of Member States’ exclusive competenc-
es, and avoided to specify that its application was limited to the cases of EU competenc-
es exercise75. Finally, the drafting of the “identity clause” met the Commission’s and 
Member States’ representative expectations, even though for very different reasons.  
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU 
is controversial. This is not necessarily linked to a bad drafting of the Treaty. Ambiguity 
may not be an unintended character of the national constitutional identity clause76. Art. 
4(2) TUE bears some elements to answer the question of sovereignty in the EU and in 
the Member States, but these elements are not enough to collect an ultimate answer. 
When the Treaty drafters tried to give such an answer, they failed. Even in the ill-fated 
constitutional Treaty a proper supremacy clause was missing – if compared with Art. 6 
of the US Constitution – and after Lisbon the only point the parties managed to agree 
                                                   
75 In an earlier stage of the drafting, the Christophersen clause had an incipit by virtue of which 
“when exercising its competencies, the Union shall respect the national identities” (emphasis added). In 
the successive drafting the incipit was removed. See Working Group V European Convention, ‘Note by Mr 
Peter Altmaier “The Division of Competencies between the Union and the Member States” (revised Ver-
sion)’ 20 <http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/2341.pdf>; Guastaferro (n 22) 26. 
76 Drawing from the words that Milan Kundera wrote with regard to the existence of the Czech na-
tion (“The existence of Czech nation was never a certainty, and precisely this uncertainty constitutes its 
most striking aspect”, cited in Judt (n 3) 637.), one could say the uncertainty of the concept of national 
identity constitutes its most striking aspect.   
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upon was an almost illegible declaration, adopting an opinion of the Council’s legal ser-
vice77.  
8. In search of a new canon: constitutional identity out of the courts 
The overview of the CJEU’s case-law related to Article 4(2) – and to Art. 
6(3)/F(1) TEU before Lisbon – shows an enormous discrepancy between the under-
standing of national identity “in the books” and national constitutional identity in ac-
tion. Despite the «excess of literature on constitutional identity»78, the CJEU referred to 
the identity-clause very rarely. 
Nonetheless there are good reasons to welcome the CJEU’s reluctance to use the 
identity-argument, being «left between a rock and a hard place in relation to the scope 
of the provision»79. On one hand, under a narrow interpretation of the identity-clause, 
the CJEU exposes EU law to the risk of rejection of the principle of primacy from the 
Member States’ constitutional and supreme courts. On the other, a broader interpreta-
tion of the clause, welcoming the national constitutional courts’ counter-limits doc-
trines, would consist of too strong a concession to Member States’ sovereignty claims, 
equally undermining the CJEU’s understanding of the principle of primacy. 
This is why the identity-clause works much better if it remains a dead letter of the 
Treaties and goes unused, at least in courts. As a judicial “nuclear weapon”, a concrete 
application of the national constitutional identity argument would probably trigger very 
violent reactions from CJEU and/or the Member States. From the former, if the notion 
is used by the Member States’ constitutional courts to protect the national legal order 
from European constitutional spill-overs. From the latter, if the notion of Member 
States’ national identity is (mis-)used by the CJEU. 
                                                   
77 The declaration adopted the Council’s legal service opinion, which substantially referred to the 
CJEU’s settled case-law: “It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a 
cornerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific 
nature of the European Community. At the time of the first judgment of this established case law (Cos-
ta/ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 6/644) there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the case to-
day. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty shall not in any way 
change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of Justice” 
78 Burgorgue-Larsen (n 55) 275. 
79 Dobbs (n 19) 36. 
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Despite the risks of this judicial nuclear “cold-war” between the CJEU and the 
Member States’ constitutional and supreme courts, for a long time the most reputable 
legal literature put confidence in the miraculous effect of the so-called judicial dialogue. 
The Europeanization of the counter-limits under Article 4(2) TEU was supposed to de-
fuse any risk of nuclear war between courts. 
Recent developments of the judicial interactions around the notion of identity 
present quite a different reality. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (a sort of commander-
in-chief of the national constitutional courts’ army in this respect) firstly adopted a 
swinging approach between sovereignist temptations (Lissabon-Urteil) and Euro-
parechtsfreundlichkeit [openness towards European law] (Mangold-Urteil)80. Then, af-
ter a long-lasting reluctance to engage directly the CJEU, the BVerfG finally submitted 
its first preliminary reference question to the CJEU in the Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT)/Gauweiler case in 2012. In a nutshell81, the case regards the decision of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to establish a framework for the purchase on the second-
ary market of a potentially unlimited amount of government bonds from (only) certain 
Member States. When the BVerfG submitted its reference, the program had only been 
announced, and still has not been put into effect. Nonetheless the sole announcement of 
the Program triggered two remarkable reactions: it calmed down the financial markets 
and it drew the anger of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The Federal Constitutional Tri-
bunal in Karlsruhe was submitted four separate Verfassungsbeschwerde (individual 
constitutional complaints)82 and a complaint through Organstreitverfahren. The com-
                                                   
80 On these developments see Theodore Konstadinides, Constitutional Identity as a Shield and 
as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 
CAMB. YEARB. EUR. LEG. STUD. 195–218 (2012). His considerations on the use of constitutional identity “as 
a sword” have been largely borne out by the successive case-law of the BVerfG, in particular with regard to 
the OMT case. 
81 On the OMT reference see the special issue of the German Law Journal, Volume 15 (2014) 
available at <http://www.germanlawjournal.com> and Mattias Wendel, ‘Exceeding Judicial Competence 
in the Name of Democracy: The German Federal Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference’ (2014) 10 Euro-
pean Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 263. 
82 The constitutional complaints were so to say individual, provided that the action was joined by 
37,000 German citizens. 
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plaints contested, above all, the (non-monetary but) economic nature of the Program, 
being therefore forbidden by Article 123 TFEU. In its decision to submit the reference to 
the CJEU, the BVerfG expressly assumed that the decision of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) was ultra vires and infringed the constitutional identity of Germany. None-
theless, instead of directly declaring the decision ultra vires and/or violating German 
constitutional identity, the German federal Tribunal submitted a reference for a prelim-
inary ruling to the CJEU. Finally, the ECJ opted for a largely diplomatic decision. On the 
one hand, the Court considered the program compatible with EU law, but on the other 
hand the ECJ filled its motivation with reassurances and reasons for the BVerfG to wel-
come the judgment as a victory of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s approach. 
Also, with regard to the protection of the German constitutional identity, the BVerfG’s 
approach was far from cooperative: on the contrary, in its reference the German Tribu-
nal noted that that «the identity review performed by the Federal Constitutional Court is 
fundamentally different from the review under Art 4 (2) sentence 1 TEU by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union»83. The point did not go unnoticed by the AG, who ob-
jected that such an interpretation of national constitutional identity as an absolute res-
ervation would put EU law in a subordinate position. Unlike the AG, the ECJ preferred 
not to address this point at all in its decision. At the time of writing this paper, the deci-
sion is pending again before the German BVerfG, which in principle might still declare 
the program unconstitutional, being a violation of the German constitutional identity. 
The effort made by the ECJ to defuse this judicial crisis makes this scenario quite im-
plausible, but nonetheless the OMT case shows that the so-called judicial dialogue “in 
action” may not have the hoped-for results when constitutional identity is at stake. 
Whatever the follow-up of the ECJ’s decision, the OMT case reveals all the dangers and 
shortcomings of the so-called judicial dialogue: dialogue, when identity issues and vital 
interests of a Member State are at stake, seems likely to turn into a deaf ultimatum.  
 
                                                   
83 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 par 27 
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION 
9. Neutralizing the conflict: respect of national identities and differenti-
ated integration 
The above summarized judicial developments suggest that blind faith in judicial 
dialogue may fall short of providing viable solutions when identity-related issues are at 
stake. Moreover, this is not the only reason to dismiss the myth of the miraculous effect 
of the judicial dialogue. Another one comes from the framing of the constitutional iden-
tity problem. In fact, an orthodox conception of this controversial concept usually focus-
es on broadly shared principles (democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights…): in these 
matters, chances for a constitutional clash are scarce and lie more on the interpretative 
ground than on the substantial one. Indeed, it is rather unlikely that the development of 
the European integration will move in the opposite direction of the basic principles of 
constitutionalism. In many cases the real issue under constitutional identity-related 
questions is connected with the outcomes of a balancing process. It is extremely implau-
sible, to put it mildly, that an EU regulation shall suddenly declare elections illegal, or 
entrust all jurisdictional competences to Governments, or enact other similar serious in-
fringements of the basic principles of constitutionalism.  
Those principles are deeply rooted and widely shared in all Member States, and 
with regard to them the European orchestra of the EU institutions and the Member 
States can count on a symphonic music score. Dissonances that may arise because of dif-
ferent readings of those basic constitutional principles would be linked to the musical 
execution and not to the composition of the music score.  
A very different case may arise when certain elements of a Member State’s consti-
tutional identity are part of a particular legal tradition of that Member State. In this re-
spect, the emergence of legal conflicts is much more plausible. Under these circum-
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stances no symphony can be played, provided the substantial cacophony84 of the music 
score. Such a perspective would take into account those elements of the constitutional 
identity that distinguish a particular constitution from another85, focusing on a hetero-
dox conception of the notion of national constitutional identity. This notion emphasizes 
non-shared elements of the Member States’ constitutional identities, and – as an added 
value – opens the door to different interpretations, rather than adding a supplementary 
analysis to the massive amount of scholarly investigations on the judicial understanding 
of the identity-clause. Empirical evidence demonstrates that, in this respect, differenti-
ated integration has already played a role. What I argue in this paper is that: a) the cur-
rent state of European integration calls for an ever more central role for differentiated 
integration and that b) differentiated integration can serve as an efficient instrument of 
preventive neutralization of ultimate conflicts between EU law and particular (non-
shared) elements of national constitutional identity. 
10. An analytical approach: constitutional differentiated integration in 
the European Union 
The accommodation of increasingly variegated national preferences in the Euro-
pean project is far from novel. On the contrary, differentiated integration is a concept 
that was not alien to the very first steps of European integration86. The Treaty of Rome 
of 1957 was not a flinty body of norms, equally applicable in every corner of the Europe-
an Economic Community (EEC). It admitted the perpetuation of preexisting forms of 
regional cooperation among the Benelux countries, acknowledging a sort of primitive 
                                                   
84 The image of a «danger of constitutional cacophony in relation to national identity» is drawn 
from von Bogdandy and Schill (n 15) 1435. 
85 For an analysis of this constitutional conception of the identity concept, in opposition to the 
concept of the identity of the people see José Luis Martí, ‘Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: 
Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the People’, National Constitutional Identity and European In-
tegration (Intersentia 2013). 
 
86 See Dominik Hanf, ‘Flexibility Clauses in the Foundign Treaties, from Rome to Nice’, The Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia nv 2001). 
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form of enhanced cooperation87. The whole Part Four of the Treaty was devoted to the 
“Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories”, recognizing a special status and 
a limited application of the norms of the treaties to the territories having special rela-
tions with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom88. Special 
provisions were provided to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the 
division of Germany89, and transitional ad hoc arrangements and derogations were 
commonly introduced in the Accession Treaties of new Member States90. 
Since the times of the signature of the first European Treaties things have 
changed significantly. From a small group of relatively homogeneous Member States, 
the European integration project has gone far ahead. Thus, the six founding Member 
States formed a small and homogeneous club in the postwar Europe: the gap in GDP per 
capita between richer and poorer economies was much smaller in 1951 than today91. The 
political homogeneity is also incomparable, should we remember that all six foreign 
                                                   
87 Art. 233 of the Treaty of Rome: “The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the existence 
or completion of regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, to the extent that the objectives of these regional unions are not attained by applica-
tion of this Treaty”, and similarly a Nordic regional cooperation agreement between Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden survived and was explicitly mentioned in the Accession Treaties of the States 
that successively joined the Union.  
88 See Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and the list of territories enclosed in Annex IV to the same 
Treaty.  
89 See Art. 82 “The provisions of this Title shall not form an obstacle to the application of 
measures taken in the Federal Republic of Germany to the extent that such measures are required in or-
der to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany to the economy of 
certain areas of the Federal Republic affected by that division” and Art. 92(2): “The following shall be 
compatible with the common market: … c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Re-
public of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to com-
pensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division”. 
90 More than half of the Protocols on the Treaty of Rome provided derogations. The same was true 
for most of the Accession’s treaties: see Hanf (n 87). 
91 In 2007, when Romania accessed the EU, German GDP per capita was 4 times the Romanian. 
In 1951, the lowest GDP per capita amounted at more than an half of the biggest one, despite the very dif-
ferent impact of war in national economies. As a matter of fact, this gap was even smaller in 1957, when 
the Treaty of Rome was signed by the same six Member States. Data are obtained from Jutta Bolt and Jan 
Luiten Zanden, ‘The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts’ (2014) 67 
The Economic History Review 627. 
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ministers who signed the Treaty of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 
were members of their respective Christian Democratic Parties92.  
A growing internal heterogeneity in the European Union is well captured by a 
comparison with the US. Regional inequality is today much greater in the EU than in the 
US93: the average per capita income is immensely more disproportionate between Lux-
embourg and Romania than between State of New York and Mississippi. The ratio 
amounts at more than 10 times in the first case, less than two times in the latter94. The 
EU enlargement certainly had an important impact on this picture, but a growing diver-
sity was already a settled trend before 200495. This being said, it comes as no surprise if 
theories of integration, disintegration and differentiated integration move back to the 
1970s96. 
                                                   
92 Judt (n 3) 157. 
93 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Rethinking the Union of Europe Post Crisis. Has Integration Gone Too 
Far?’ (Cambridge University Press) 39. 
94 The comparison of the GDP per capita in Luxembourg and Romania is striking, but may be 
dismissed as inaccurate, as long as it considers extreme examples. Nonetheless it is remarkable that Ro-
mania’s GDP per capita amounts at less than half of the GDP per capita in not less than 15 Member 
States. Similar outcomes would result if GDP per capita of Bulgaria, Hungary or Croatia were used for the 
comparison.  Data are drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Per Capita Real GDP, Interac-
tive Data”, available at <http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTableHtml.cfm?reqid=70&step=10&isuri=1&7003 
=1000&7035=1&7004=naics&7005=1&7006=28000,36000&7036=1&7001=11000&7002=1&7090=70& 
7007=2013&7093=levels> and from the Statistical Office of the European Communities.  EUROSTAT: 
Regional Statistics. Reference Guide. Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eu- 
rostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00001>.  
95 To put it in another way: “[t]he levels of economic development are very different from one 
Member State to another. Taking into account the figures available for the year 2009 and with 100 as the 
index average for the EU-27 GDP per capita, seven Member States were below 65% of this average and 
two of them were around 45% of this average. […] As a comparison, for the USA and for the same year 
2009, no State was less than 70% of the average national index”. The analysis is based on EUROSTAT da-
ta, see Jean-Claude Piris, ‘It Is Time for the Euro Area to Develop Further Closer Cooperation Among Its 
Members’ (2011) 5/11 Jean Monnet Working Paper 31 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/11/110501.pdf>. This growing heterogeneity does not 
emergence only from a comparison with the United States, but also from a comparison of the economic 
picture of Europe at the very first steps of the integration project with today’s picture. In 2007, when Ro-
mania accessed the EU, German GDP per capita was 4 times the Romanian. In 1951 the lowest GDP per 
capita amounted at more than an half of the biggest one, despite the very different impact of the war on 
national economies. As a matter of fact, this gap was even smaller in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was 
signed by the same six Member States. Data are obtained from Bolt and Zanden (n 92). 
96 This debate has been characterized by “an excess of terminology, which can give even the most 
experienced specialist of European integration a severe case of semantic indigestion” (Alexander CG 
Stubb, ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’ (1996) 34 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Stud-
ies 283, 283.. I will refer to ‘differentiated integration’ in the meaning of a term used to “denote variations 
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One of the first models of differentiated integration emerges from a series of arti-
cles published in 1973 by Ralph Dahrendorf, at that time European Commissioner97. His 
proposal of ‘integration à la carte’ was based on the idea that no Member State must 
participate in everything, and sometimes recurred again in more recent years. 
Only a few years later, the European federalist and Belgium Prime Minister Tin-
demans elaborated on a ‘multi-speed Europe’ in 1975. His report on the future of Euro-
pean integration considered differences among the (at that time) nine Member States 
already very large. Therefore Tindemans held that whatever European target would be 
set in the following times, different Member States would never be able to reach them at 
the same speed. 
The further ‘concentric circles’ model is based on the idea of a highly integrated 
hardcore and raised some interest since 1994, when the France’s prime minister re-
ferred to it, followed by the ‘Schäuble-Lamers-Paper’, which has been adopted by the 
CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Parliament and referred to a Kerneuro-
pa. Resemblances of this approach bear again in year 2000 in the avant-garde project 
favored by Joschka Fischer, whose challenge was accepted by Delors and Chirac and re-
launched by Chirac and Schröder some years later. 
Another possible response to a growing heterogeneity of Europe has been built on 
a European declination of James Buchanan’s theory of clubs98. Majone’s Europe as a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in the application of European policies or variations in the level and intensity of participation in European 
policy regimes”, as specified by Helen Wallace, ‘Differentiated Integration’, Encyclopedia of the European 
Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998) 137. For a thorough analysis of differentiated integration until 
1996 and a very complete categorization see Stubb. A more updated analysis is to be found in Kenneth 
Dyson and Angelos Sepos (eds), Which Europe?: The Politics of Differentiated Integration (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010). 
97 The articles were published in “Die Zeit” under the pseudonym ‘Wieland Europa’. Dahrendorf’s 
idea of a Europe à la carte is summarized in his ‘Jean Monnet Lecture’ held at the European University 
Institute in Florence, on November 26th 1979.  Many parts of the lecture are not only very inspiring, but in 
hindsight, prophetic: “I have often been struck by the prevailing view in Community circles that the worst 
can happen is any movement towards what is called Europe à la carte. This is not only somewhat odd for 
someone who likes to make his own choices, but also illustrates that strange puritanism, not say maso-
chism which underlies much of Community action: Europe has to hurt in order to be good”, Ralf Dahren-
dorf, ‘A Third Europe?’ [1979] European University Institute <http://aei.pitt.edu/11346/2/11346.pdf>. 
98 James M Buchanan, ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’ (1965) 32 Economica 1. 
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‘club of clubs’99 has been theorized as a model of differentiated integration which aims 
at reducing the so-called costs of uniformity through a variety of institutional arrange-
ments. One of the most relevant implications of the application of this model, would be 
the understanding of the European Monetary Union as a ‘club good’ rather than a ‘col-
lective good’ (i.e. the Euro should be transformed from a collective good imposed to all 
European Members to a good from whose benefits and burdens the Member of the Eu-
ropean club may be excluded or may choose to be excluded).  
Lately the possibility (and desirability) of a concentric development of the Euro-
pean Union was envisaged in the proposal of a ‘Euro Area avant-garde’ group100, which 
is de facto already imposing itself in the Euro crisis developments. The idea includes 
both elements of the concentric circles model and the temporariness of the multi-speed 
Europe model. 
Whichever model of differentiated integration one considers, a common denomi-
nator deserves attention: all the above mentioned examples (and many other models 
which have been theorized) are based on the assumption that flexibility is needed in an 
ever larger and socio-economically more heterogeneous union. The prescribed therapies 
may vary greatly, but there is a broad agreement on the diagnosis: since Member States 
are strikingly diverse in terms of socio-economic conditions and political preferences, 
the one-size-fits-all model of European integration is too strict and largely inadequate. 
In this picture, the legal and constitutional diversity of the 28 Member States is hardly 
considered, and the diversity of constitutional identities rarely appears as a possible 
source of differentiated integration. 
Comparing 1951 or 1957 with 2015 Europe, the differences are not limited to the 
economic or political dimension. The gap grew also in constitutional terms, in particular 
with regard to the unamendable core of Constitutions. The constitutional cultures of the 
six founding countries experienced an unprecedented development, and the Union pro-
gressively welcomed an increasing number of members, whose constitutional traditions 
                                                   
99 Majone (n 94) 113–117, 316–322. 
100 Piris (n 96). 
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have very different roots if compared with the ones of the founding countries, or whose 
constitutional texts belong to very different constitutional generations. A growing con-
stitutional variety has been registered on two fronts. Under a static horizontal perspec-
tive, it is undeniable that the legal tradition of the six founding Member State expressed 
much more homogeneous legal cultures, if compared with those Member States that 
joined the Union in the successive enlargements. The EU gradually embraced the com-
mon law tradition of the UK, the Nordic models of State and the post-socialist countries 
with the last enlargements. This diversity has moreover to be combined with a vertical 
stratification of constitutional diversity. After World War II, a “flowering time”101 of con-
stitutional clauses providing substantive limitations to constitutional amendment power 
has started. Although the idea (and problem) of limiting the constitutional amendment 
power was not new, it took a much more central role in the post-war constitutional de-
velopments. In many cases the ‘counter-limits’ doctrines were founded upon the 
achievements of these new developments in the field of the limits to constitutional 
amendment power102. Against this background, ‘constitutional identity’ has been gradu-
ally developed as a unitary category that encompassed together limits to constitutional 
amendments and counter-limits. In very few countries this experience developed by 
means of explicit constitutional adjustments. This was the case of Europa-Artikel in the 
German Fundamental Law (Art. 23 GG), which was introduced by means of a constitu-
tional amendment in 1992, and provides an explicit referral to the limits to the constitu-
tional amendment power (Art. 79.3 GG). In a nutshell, according to these combined 
provisions, the German Fundamental Law opposed the same ultimate limits it opposed 
to the constitutional amendment power to EU law. In several other Countries the chal-
lenge to unconditional normative freedom of constituted powers developed in the ab-
                                                   
101 For the overview of this time of flowering eternity-clauses (the A. refers to a “Blütezeit” in the 
original text), see  K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band III/2, München, 
1994, 1094   
102 Patricia Popelier, ‘“Europe Clauses” and Constitutional Strategies in the Face of Multi-Level 
Governance’ (2014) 21 Maastricht journal of European and comparative law 300. 
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sence of eternity-clauses103: in the silence of the constitution, constitutional limits to the 
constitutional amendment power have been an interpretative outcome of many consti-
tutional courts’ case-law. 
The combination of these horizontal and vertical developments enhanced both 
the constitutional diversity and the constitutional rigidity of the untouchable cores of 
the Member States’ constitutions. Alongside socio-economic factors and political prefer-
ences, these constitutional developments deserve consideration in the framework of dif-
ferentiated integration.   
11. Opt-outs, derogations, legal guarantees: a Europe of bits and pieces? 
It is against this background that differentiated integration may be considered as 
a viable means of accommodation of non-shared features of Members States’ national 
constitutional identities. Empirical evidence of the application of differentiated integra-
tion with this purpose may be drawn from the European experience and some pragmatic 
development in the last twenty years. After decades of academic speculation and politi-
cal debate, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam represented a significant turning-
point in the practice of differentiated integration in the EU. Indeed, enhanced coopera-
tion was incorporated in the structure of the treaties. Here I am not referring only to the 
proper institute of closer/enhanced cooperation (firstly regulated in Art. K.12 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, later amended by the Nice and Lisbon Treaties), but to a broader 
concept. This includes “in-built” forms of enhanced cooperation: (in)famously the Euro 
and the Schengen Area.  
These have been started with the participation of a limited number of Member 
States, but were aimed at including all EU Member States. Legally speaking, decision 
adopted in the Schengen and Euro Areas are part of the acquis communautaire. The 
Schengen cooperation aims at removing the checks on persons at internal borders and 
granting access to the Schengen Information System. The Schengen Area was founded 
                                                   
103 On these developments, among many others see Yaniv Roznai, ‘Towards a Theory of Una-
mendability’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2569292 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2569292> accessed 13 July 2015. 
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in 1985 by means of an international Agreement, established outside of the European 
Community, by five out of the ten EU Member States ratione temporis. It was incorpo-
rated in the EU Treaties by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and since then it has been an 
“in-built” mechanism of enhanced cooperation ever since. Twenty-two out of the twen-
ty-eight EU Member States have joined so far. Four out of the six EU Member States 
which are not part of the Schengen Area – Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania – are 
legally bound and wish to join the area. Eventually, only Ireland and the UK will main-
tain opt-outs (see below para. 11.1 and 11.2). 
By contrast, the first steps towards a Euro Area were taken within the framework 
of the EU institutions. The Euro was meant to become the common currency of the Eu-
ropean Union. The reluctance of some Member States made things more complicated 
and, as widely known, Denmark and the UK obtained a permanent opt-out through the 
Treaty of Maastricht, whilst Sweden obtained a de facto opt-out104. All other Member 
States are subject to the general principle that the Euro is the single currency of all EU 
Member States, although the participation in the Euro is conditional upon the fulfilment 
of the mandatory convergence criteria105, subject to a decision of the Council. 
That being said (also in light of some successive adjustments), the Treaty of 
Maastricht could be considered as a leap of quality jump from an old conception of the 
European integration process to a new one. Opt-outs and derogations could be seen as 
inevitable side-effects of this progress. Such an interpretation would give only a very 
partial picture of the 1992 European moment of truth.  
As a matter of fact, the Treaty of Maastricht has also been a turning point in the 
constitutional narrative of the European integration process. As already mentioned, the 
Maastricht Treaty included for the first time the respect of national identities in the 
                                                   
104 Under the 1994 Treaty of Accession, Sweden is obliged to join the Eurozone once it meets the 
requirement laid down by the Treaties. But Sweden obtained that joining the second step of European Ex-
change Mechanism (ERM) should be voluntary and subject to approval by a referendum: as accession to 
ERM is a condition to adopt the single currency, Sweden is de facto still master of its own monetary desti-
ny. 
105 See Art. 140 TFEU and Protocol Nr. 13 on the “convergence criteria”. 
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wording of EU Treaties. The appearance of national identity in the Treaty of Maastricht 
was part of a more comprehensive balance between supranational achievements and 
fears of a supranational overcoming of the national State. Against this background, it is 
not a matter of coincidence that the Treaty of Maastricht marked a decisive milestone 
also in the field of differentiated integration106. The Treaty introduced a set of protocols 
and declarations addressed to specific needs of certain Member States, allowing for lim-
ited exemptions from the acquis communautaire. This fragmentation has been de-
scribed as a “significant blow to the vision of integration espoused by the classical narra-
tive”107, and a threat to the uniform application of EU law108. In a more catastrophist 
view, opt-outs and exemptions were able to open a Pandora box: they would have led to 
the undesirable destiny of a “Europe of bits and pieces”109. Other commentators predict-
ed no less than a destructive disintegration of the EU110. On the other side of the fence 
are those scholars who welcomed opt-outs as desirable means of a new path of differen-
tiated integration111. According to this view, there should be no single supreme authority 
(neither the national State, nor the EU): integrative and disintegrative dynamics should 
be accommodated within the EU legal order, and perspectives of differentiated integra-
                                                   
106 On the trade-off between enlargement of EU competences and flexibility see Matej Avbelj, ‘Re-
visiting Flexible Integration in Times of Post-Enlargement and the Lustration of EU Constitutionalism’ 
(2008) 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 131, 139. For an assessment of the same trade-
off after Lisbon, see Dobbs (n 19). 
107 Matej Avbelj, ‘Questioning European Union Constitutionalisms’ in Russell A Miller and Peer 
Zumbansen (eds), Comparative Law as Transnational Law: A Decade of the German Law Journal 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 395. 
108 Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott 
(eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility (Bloomsbury Publishing 2000). 
109 Deirdre Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 
30 Common Market Law Review 17. The metaphor already emerged in the EUI Working Paper by Joseph 
HH Weiler, ‘Supranationalism Revisited, a Retrospective: The European Communities after 30 Years’, Noi 
si mura: selected working papers of the European University Institute (European University Institute 
1986) 356–357. 
110 Svein S Andersen and Nick Sitter, ‘Differentiated Integration: What Is It and How Much Can 
the EU Accommodate?’ (2006) 28 Journal of European Integration 313. 
111 See Jo Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’ (1996) 16 Ox-
ford Journal of Legal Studies 231. Renaud Dehousse, ‘Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutional-
ism in a Polycentric Polity’ in Joseph HH Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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tion in a multi-level dimension are welcomed as a desirable and necessary development 
of a “post-sovereign” model112. 
Whatever opinion one may have on these issues, the opt-outs annexed to the 
Treaty of Maastricht has not been an isolated experience of the recent European integra-
tion’s developments. The negotiations between more or less integrationist Member 
States frequently led to deadlocks, where “braking actors” may operate as veto players. 
In these circumstances there are three possible ways out of the deadlock: a) the contro-
versial measure may be abandoned b) the avant-garde states may accommodate the 
rearguard states by granting them opt-outs, exemptions or derogations (a clear example 
is the Eurozone) or c) the avant-garde may step out from the EU framework and con-
clude a separate treaty (this is the case of the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability 
Mechanism).  
In the following paragraphs I will analyze some of the most significant examples 
of differentiated integration. The analysis makes of course no claim of being exhaustive 
of all derogations in force, but rather aims at addressing a reasonable number of case-
studies. I will mainly concentrate my attention on authentic opt-outs. Where appropri-
ate, I will also take into account other form of derogations. However the analysis is lim-
ited to the level of primary law. Since authentic opt-outs are currently in place in favor 
of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, it will make sense to proceed with a country-by-
country analysis. 
11.1. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is commonly recognized as an opt-out champion. This idea 
is partly based on the overall rough reputation of the UK as a euro-cynical-in-nature 
Member State, and in part based on an accurate picture of the legal reality. The UK ben-
efits from a special status in many areas of the EU, and at least two of them lie in the 
core of the integration project: Schengen and Euro.  
                                                   
112 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law State and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth (Oxford University Press 1999). 
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The negative British attitude towards the border-free zone moves back to the 
times of the conclusion of the (then) international agreement that Margaret Thatcher re-
fused to sign. Since then the stance has changed in many respect, but what seems still 
today to be a total taboo is the very core of Schengen, namely the common border policy. 
A more pro-European attitude of the British government in 1997 allowed in fact the in-
corporation of the Schengen acquis into the Amsterdam Treaty. This move came at a 
price in favor of the UK, namely its non-participation. The UK was indeed granted an 
opt-out Protocol from Schengen, with a limited degree of flexibility. The British Gov-
ernment could not just pick the measures in which it considered to participate, but 
could only request to take part in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen acquis. 
In March 1999 the United Kingdom applied to participate in several measures, 
including the police and judicial cooperation provisions and part of the Schengen In-
formation System. This request was approved by a Council Decision in 2000 and fully 
implemented by a Decision of the Council of the EU starting on 1 January 2005. 
Nonetheless, the core of the Schengen idea – the free border zone – remained un-
touched over the Channel: “[a] significant majority on the domestic scene, led by Con-
servatives and other eurosceptics, have ‘securitized’ the British Schengen protocol to the 
extent that it appears to constitute a guarantee of the survival of the British nation”113. 
A second remarkable exemption obtained by the UK concerns the single curren-
cy. Protocol No. 11 was annexed at the Treaty of Maastricht (now renumbered Protocol 
No. 15) and recognizes “that the United Kingdom shall not be obliged or committed to 
move to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union without a separate decision to 
do so by its government and Parliament”. Later, during the negotiations of the Amster-
dam Treaty of 1997, the UK was granted an opt-out from what was the Justice and 
Home Affairs Pillar. The character of this derogation was extremely flexible, allowing 
the UK to participate in EU measures on a case-by-case basis. After the dismantling of 
                                                   
113 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration: Circumventing Na-
tional Opt-Outs in Justice and Home Affairs’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 62, 71. See also 
Antje Wiener, ‘Forging Flexibility - the British “No” to Schengen’ (2000) 1 European Journal of Migration 
and Law 441. 
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the three-pillars structure, the opt-out was renewed in the area of freedom, security and 
justice (AFSJ) with the Treaty of Lisbon (Protocol No 20). Additionally, according to 
Protocol No 36114, the UK had an all-or-nothing choice to opt out of all acts of the Union 
in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which 
have been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Then the UK 
would have been able to opt in again in single measures on a case-by-case basis. This all 
but plain procedure115 led to a full opt out of the UK from the approximately 130 “ex-
third-pillar” measures in July 2014, after which the UK notified its wish to opt back into 
35 of these measures, six of which are included in the Schengen acquis. Among these are 
the chapters of the Schengen Convention on police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and the Schengen Information System (SIS II, which is the police/justice body 
of the Schengen data base). The remaining 29 non-Schengen measures include the Eu-
ropean Arrest Warrant, Europol and Eurojust. 
A different case is the UK’s opt-out in social policy. Its peculiarity lies in the fact 
that the British opt-out from the social chapter is a ceased one. The opt-out was includ-
ed in Protocol No 14 to the Maastricht Treaty, excluding the UK from the EU decision-
making procedures on social rights’ implementation. Any legislation adopted in these 
fields would not apply to the UK. Finally the differentiation terminated for a very simple 
reason: the Labor Party won the elections, and the opt-out did not match the new politi-
cal orientation in the UK. 
                                                   
114 Whereas Protocol No 20 regards the application of certain aspect of the AFSJ to the UK and to 
Ireland, Protocol No 36, Article 10(4)(5) is only applicable to the UK. As a consequence, the Irish and Brit-
ish position with regard to the possibility of opting-out and opting back in shall be considered separately. 
115 On the details of the opt-out and in procedure see Alicia Hinarejos, John R Spencer and Steve 
Peers, ‘Opting out of EU Criminal Law: What Is Actually Involved?’ [2012] CELS Working Paper 
<http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/publications/working_papers.php>. 
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11.2. Ireland 
Ireland shares with the UK more than one opt-out, even though the underlying 
reasons not to participate in the concerned matters can be very different in the two 
Countries116.  
The Irish position with regards to the Schengen Agreement has always been 
strongly influenced by the British reluctance to join the free-borders area. Irish acces-
sion to the Schengen Area without the UK would have caused the end of the long estab-
lished Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK, and would therefore impose 
exit and entry controls on persons traveling through the two Countries, including the 
land frontier between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Ireland was therefore granted with the UK an opt-out from the Schengen Area in 
a Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty. The same Protocol provided both Countries with 
the possibility to request to take part in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis. As far as police and judicial cooperation provisions of the Schengen acquis are 
concerned, Ireland applied to participate in June 2000. The Irish request was approved 
by a Council Decision in 2002, but has by far not yet been implemented.  
Ireland joined the UK in the Protocol No 21 as well, being granted an opt-out in 
the area of Freedom, Security and Justice117. The Irish position with regard to the AFSJ 
differs from the British one only with regard to Article 10(4)(5) of Protocol 36. These 
provisions, carrying out the complicated procedures of opting-out and selective opting 
back in at the end of the transitional period, only apply to the UK. 
This being said, the most interesting position regarding Ireland is, for our pur-
poses, the Irish Protocol on the Lisbon Treaty. This Protocol forms part of the agree-
ment reached between the Heads of State or Government after the Irish negative out-
                                                   
116 This dependency has for a long time caused a lack of scholarly interest on Irish opt-outs and 
derogations, in short because “so far Ireland mainly follows the UK” (in these terms Adler-Nissen (n 114) 
64.) and deserves therefore little consideration. Things changed after the Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty 
and the negotiation of an “authentic” Irish protocol (see below in the body text). 
117 See the debate at the Dáil Éireann held on Wednesday, 24 October 2007, available at 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/. See also Maria Fletcher, ‘EU Criminal Justice: Beyond Lisbon’ in 
Christina Eckes and Theodore Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice: A European Public Order (Cambridge University Press 2011) 26. 
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come in the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. To cut a long story short, the Irish ‘no’ 
seemed to cast the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty’s shadows on the ratification proce-
dure of the Lisbon Treaty. The “concerns of the Irish people”118 were addressed with 
three instruments (informally called ‘the Guarantees’): a decision of the Heads of State 
or Government of EU Member States acting in their capacity as sovereign states; a sol-
emn declaration by the European Council on workers’ rights, social policy and other re-
lated issues and a National Declaration by Ireland on Irish security and defense policy.  
The first instrument was a legally binding international agreement and was 
adopted with the intention of transforming the decision into a protocol to the EU trea-
ties with the adoption of the next Accession Treaty119.  
 The Protocol included three “clarifications”. Firstly, it was clarified that the pro-
visions of the Irish Constitution on the protection of the right to life120, family and edu-
cation would not be affected by the Lisbon Treaty or the provisions of the CFREU. Sec-
ondly, the Protocol confirmed that nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon makes any change of 
any kind, for any Member State, to the extent or operation of the competence of the Eu-
ropean Union in relation to taxation. Thirdly, the Protocol provided a clarification that 
Ireland’s traditional policy in military neutrality will remain unchanged and unaffected 
by the Treaty. 
                                                   
118 These concerns were collected in the findings of a government-commissioned public survey 
about the reasons of the ‘no’ vote in the Irish Referendum. The survey was conducted six weeks after the 
vote, and indicated among these reasons a ‘lack of knowledge/information/understanding’ of the Treaty; 
concerns about the ‘loss’ of an Irish commissioner after the planned reduction of the number of Commis-
sioners; the threat to the traditional Irish neutrality and possible military implications, such as a conscrip-
tion to a European army and finally the threats to the respect of the right to life of the unborn. In the same 
survey, Irish electorate held as very important the protection of workers’ rights, the national control over 
public services and corporation taxation rates. See David Phinnemore, The Treaty of Lisbon Origins and 
Negotiation (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 190. 
119 The Protocol was approved in Section 2 of the Treaty of Accession of Croatia and was then 
drafted as a separate document, entering into force on 1 December 2014.  
120 Note that the Irish Protocol on Abortion constitutional policies, which has been in force since 
1993, remains unaffected.  
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Additionally, a separate agreement was reached among the Member States to re-
assure the Irish concerns about the possible loss of a representative in the Commission, 
along with the planned reduction in its size121.  
11.3. Denmark 
Denmark was granted a number of exemptions and derogations from Maastricht 
to Lisbon, so that it has been described as “a smart state handling a differentiated inte-
gration dilemma”122. In 1991, the final draft of the Maastricht Treaty gave Denmark the 
right to decide if and when they would join the Euro123. A first referendum was called on 
the whole Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the following year, and resulted in a 
narrow ‘no’. A national compromise followed: the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist 
People’s Party and the Social Liberal Party agreed on a position that claimed the opt-out 
from the single currency as the highest national priority. This position proved successful 
and the agreement on the Euro opt-out was included in the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement, 
a Council decision that followed the Danish negative outcome on the Maastricht refer-
endum. Actually, the agreement granted Denmark four opt-outs, concerning not only 
the third stage of the EMU, but also the Common Security and Defense Policy, the Jus-
tice and Home Affairs and the citizenship of the Union124.  
A new referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was called on 19 May 1993, resulting 
in an approval by the 56,7% of voters. As far as the Euro opt-out is concerned, when the 
third stage of EMU started (1 January 1999), the Danish Government decided to call for 
a new referendum on the abolition of the opt out. The Danish voters, though, rejected 
once more the full participation to the EMU. Since the beginning of the Euro Crisis in 
2008 the Danish full participation in the EMU seems a far-off prospect. 
                                                   
121 The agreement to maintain the number of Commissioners equal to the number of Member 
States was reached in the European Council at its meeting of 11-12 December 2008. 
122 Lee Miles and Anders Wivel, ‘A Smart State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma?’ 
in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the European Union (1st ed, Routledge 2014). 
123 For an overview of the troubled relation between Denmark and the single currency, see Martin 
Marcussen, ‘Denmark and the Euro Opt-Out’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the Eu-
ropean Union (1st ed, Routledge 2014). 
124 In this paper I will not elaborate on all the Danish opt-outs, but I will focus only on the Euro 
and the AFSJ opt-outs. 
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The repeated rejection to join the third phase of the EMU bears some peculiari-
ties and merits special attention: for many years, governing parties have all been in fa-
vor of overcoming the Euro opt-out125, and it has been considered “technically unprob-
lematic for Denmark to sign up for the Euro-philosophy”126. The reluctance to join the 
EMU was the result of a combination of factors, which gave birth to the Danish way to 
approach important EU-related decisions, requiring an open and wide debate and even-
tually a referendum. This should be the way to manage essential EU-related issues, “ir-
respective of the attitude of the majority of the parliament”127. 
The economic dimension of the opt-out-or-in played of course an important role, 
but it was not the only factor that was taken into consideration, if for no other reasons, 
than there was no one right answer to the matter. Besides the economic dimension of 
the decision, other forces pushed in the direction of the opt-out, namely the fact that the 
euro was not seen “only as a mean of payment” but also “as an expression of national 
identity and sovereignty”128. 
Still now, a similar feeling seems still now to pervade the Danish understanding 
of the opt-out from the (then) Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)129. The opt-out was in-
cluded in the Edinburgh package and survived through the ‘semi-permanent Treaty re-
vision process’130. Nonetheless the European normative framework in the area has 
changed significantly and against this new background the opt-out takes on an entirely 
new significance. 
                                                   
125 Marcussen (n 124) 52. 
126 ibid 48. 
127 ibid. 
128 ibid 55. 
129 According to Adler-Nissen “[t]he opt-out remains an important symbol of autonomy for large 
parts of the Danish population”, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Justice and Home Affairs. Denmark as an Active 
Differential European’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the European Union 
(Routledge 2014) 67. See also Lene Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe’ in 
Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds), European Integration and National Identity: the Challenge of the 
Nordic States (Routledge 2002). 
130 Bruno de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-
Permanent Treaty Revision Process’ in PR Beaumont, Carole Lyons and Neil Walker (eds), Convergence 
and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart Publishing 2002). 
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The 1992 opt-outs were expression of the refusal of a federal Europe, and left the 
door open to intergovernmental cooperation, which was in any case the rule in the form 
third pillar matters. Indeed, Denmark’s full participation in cooperating on JHA was ex-
pressly stated in the Edinburgh Agreement. The turning-point came in 1997 with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the supranationalization of important matters, such as asylum, 
immigration, border control and civil law policies. Except for criminal law and police 
cooperation, areas where the intergovernmental method still applied, Denmark was left 
out from many JHA policy areas.  
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the potential impact of the Danish opt-out 
had dramatically increased. The dismantling of the pillars’ system has the consequence 
of excluding Denmark from the areas where intergovernmental method had still applied 
before Lisbon. The former JHA opt-out currently appears under Protocol No 22 to the 
treaties. First of all, it provides that Denmark is bound by the Schengen rules (Denmark 
joined the Schengen Agreement in 1996), but only under international law (which 
means no CJEU’s jurisdiction applies). Conversely, Denmark is not bound by any other 
provision of (or adopted pursuant to) Title V of Part Three of the TFEU (immigration 
and asylum law, or civil cooperation)131. Denmark is bound by acts of the Union in the 
field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, but the Country is not bound by acts in these 
areas if adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Finally the opt-out protocol is coupled with an “auto-termination clause” that al-
lows Denmark to renounce the opt-out, or to transform it into a selective opt-out-or-in, 
following the British and Irish Model. The opt-in needs a referendum approval, which 
Danish recent history showed to be always insidious. The Danish Prime Minister has re-
cently announced such a referendum, considering the fact that Europol reform would 
have excluded the Country’s participation from that measure, in virtue of the provisions 
of Protocol 22.   
                                                   
131 Denmark concluded parallel agreements with the EU in some of these areas, such as the Dublin 
rules on asylum applications; the Brussels Regulation on civil and commercial jurisdiction; and the Regu-
lation on service of documents. 
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According to the outlined framework, Denmark seems one of the most mistrust-
ful and reluctant Member States. Denmark certainly “profited” from some of its ar-
rangements of differentiated integration, mainly through different policies on certain is-
sues. In particular, with regards to the asylum and immigration conundrum the opt-out 
left room to adopt strict policies regarding asylum and family reunification. Conversely, 
an in-depth analysis of the Danish policies in many other fields where the Country re-
tained an opt-out shows the opposite. In almost every aspect of the former JHA pillar, 
Danish authorities adopted legislative policies, which are perfectly consistent with EU 
law policies. A “systematic mimicking and copying of EU legislation”132 has been re-
vealed in many areas, making Denmark an “active copycat”133. Informal harmonization, 
parallel agreements and EU regulation mimicking made of Denmark more “a rule-taker” 
than “a rule-maker”134. 
11.4. The curious case of the UK, Poland (and Czech Republic) and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
It is not uncommon to find in the category of opt-outs also the British and Polish 
Protocol concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. During 
the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, the UK and Poland insisted upon a special Proto-
col to the Treaties regarding the EUCFR, which was finally annexed to the Treaty (Pro-
tocol No 30)135. The wording of the Protocol consisted in a normative puzzle, including a 
relatively long preamble and two substantive provisions, aiming at limiting the applica-
tion of the EUCFR in the UK and Poland136.  
                                                   
132 Adler-Nissen (n 130) 69. 
133 ibid. 
134 Adler-Nissen (n 130). 
135 Czech Republic has not been initially included in Protocol 30. After the insistence of President 
Václav Klaus – who affirmed that Czech Republic would have refused to ratify the Treaty unless the Coun-
try would have been added to the Protocol – EU leaders agreed to amend the protocol at the time of the 
next accession Treaty (Croatia). The amendment was drafted and the procedure started, but successively 
the very Czech Republic, with its new President Miloš Zeman, withdrew the request. In May 2014, the 
Council formally acknowledged the Czech withdrawal for a quasi-opt-out from the EUCFR.  
136 Article 1: 1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or ad-
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If compared with all previous opt-outs, the situation is partially different. Indeed, 
qualification of the Protocol as a proper opt-out has been controversial from the outset. 
Nowadays the major part of the legal literature137, supported by and supporting the 
CJEU138 case-law, tends to exclude that protocol No 30 provides an opt-out from the 
EUCFR if favor of the UK and Poland. It is nonetheless interesting to investigate the 
reasons behind the negotiation of the protocol. To cut a long story short, the Protocol to 
the Charter has been “an exercise in smoke and mirrors”139. The “British Protocol” No 
30 has been presented to the Eurosceptic audience as a proper opt-out, but has never 
been interpreted in this manner by the British Government. Official statements of Gov-
ernment’s branches openly stated that “the UK Protocol does not constitute an ‘opt-
out’”140. In this respect, it has been noted that “these opt-outs imply an outright rejec-
tion of political integration”141 and seem to be ‘purely political phenomena’ (I will get 
back to this category in the conclusive consideration, see below para. 12). This is howev-
er questionable. As a matter of fact, the (then) Prime Minister Tony Blair’s words seem 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ministrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms. 
 2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter cre-
ates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United 
Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law. 
Article 2: To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it 
shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains 
are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United Kingdom. 
137 Steve Peers, ‘The “Opt-Out” That Fell to Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 375; Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty 
of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights’ in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 
Vienna 2008) 244–9; Catherine Barnard, ‘The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’ in Univ-Prof Dr Stefan Griller and Univ-Prof Dr 
Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer Vienna 2008); Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, 
Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2010) 237–40. 
138 The CJEU clearly stated that Protocol No 30 “does not call into question the applicability of the 
Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland” and that “it does not intend to exempt the Republic of Po-
land or the UK from the obligation to comply with the provision of the Charter”, see Case C-411/10 NS, 
para 119-120. 
139 Barnard (n 138) 281. 
140 House of Lords EU Select Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, 10th Re-
port, 2007-8, HL Paper 62, para. 5.86. Exactly the same words “the UK-specific protocol is not an ‘opt-
out’” were used by Jim Murphy, Minister for Europe in his address to the House of Commons’ European 
Scrutiny Committee, see European Scrutiny, 35th report, 2006-7. 
141 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-Be World Power the EU at Fifty (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 217. 
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to refer to something more serious than a political tantrum. Explaining the reasons of 
the opt-out, Blair referred to the “long and difficult memories of the battles fought to get 
British law in proper order”142 in the areas addressed by the Charter, and not to his Gov-
ernment’s political preferences. As a matter of fact the opt-out may come as a surprise, if 
one considers that negotiations have been conducted by a government run by the Labor 
Party, whose origins lie in the workers movement. This would suggest that British con-
cerns were not ‘purely political phenomena’, but that they expressed a deeper constitu-
tional understanding.  
The Polish situation seems even more surprising, if not ironic, provided that the 
Government embarrassment was expressly stated in a declaration enclosed to the Lis-
bon Treaty: “Poland declares that, having regard to the tradition of social movement of 
‘Solidarity’ and its significant contribution to the struggle for social and labor rights, it 
fully respects social and labor rights, as established by European Union law, and in par-
ticular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union”143. This suggests that the Polish position on the EUCFR was not a ‘purely po-
litical phenomena’, or at least that the Polish quasi opt-out was not expressing a political 
preference in the field of social and labor rights. In the opinion of an authoritative part 
of the legal scholarship, this apparent paradox is explained with Poland’s fear in other 
areas, such as family law, with special regard to same-sex couples regulation144.  
11.5. Identity-tailored protocols? 
Besides the relatively (in)famous opt-outs analyzed above, various Protocols, opt-
outs and derogations have been adopted in the history of European integration. None-
theless, they can have little or no effect on or connection with the understanding of 
                                                   
142 The British position was summed up by Tony Blair in his Cardiff Speech of November 2002 
and is cited in Finn Laursen, The Rise and Fall of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers 2008) 211. 
143 See Declaration No 62 by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom. 
144 “Poland’s concerns are not with social and labor rights. Poland’s real fears lie with subjects 
such as gay marriage and abortion but the Protocol (and the Charter) do not touch on these”: the apparent 
paradox is explained in these terms by Barnard (n 138) 276. 
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Member States’ constitutional identity. Protocol No 3 on the Treaty of Accession of 
Sweden, granting to the Sami people an exclusive right to reindeer husbandry certainly 
provides a derogation of fundamental freedoms of the Treaty. This does not automati-
cally mean that reindeer husbandry is part of the constitutional identity of Sweden. 
The matter seems to have been treated differently with respect to the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which introduced a set of protocols. Some of these addressed national inter-
ests of certain Member States, and one could argue that the protocols consisted of pre-
ventative measures to avoid future conflicts. The ease with which narrowly tailored Pro-
tocols had been conceded in the Maastricht agreements was severely criticized at that 
time. It was in this respect that a potential hijacking of the acquis communautaire has 
been denounced in a well-known article, and a ‘Europe of bits and Pieces’145 has been 
deplored. Three of the protocols were questioned more than the others146.  
Protocol no. 17 (so-called Grogan Protocol) provided that “nothing in the Treaty 
on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in the 
Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application 
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of Ireland”. This provision originated 
from the famous Grogan judgment of the ECJ147. The case dealt with student organiza-
tions publishing in the Republic of Ireland – whose Constitution protects the right to life 
of the unborn – the names, addresses and phone numbers of abortion clinics in Great 
Britain. The ECJ had no reason (nor jurisdiction) to decide on the legality of abortion, 
but the Court held that the medical termination of pregnancy constituted a service with-
in the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty. Nonetheless the ECJ held that it is not con-
trary to EU law for Ireland to prohibit from distributing information about abortion 
clinics. According to the ECJ’s view, Member States are allowed deference to restrict 
free movement of services for "justified public policy reasons", and this was the case. 
                                                   
145 Curtin (n 110). 
146 For an analysis of these protocols against the background of national constitutional identity, 
see Giuseppe Martinico, ‘What Lies Behind Article 4(2) TEU?’, National Constitutional Identity and Eu-
ropean Integration (Intersentia 2013) 100 ff. 
147 Case C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen 
Grogan and others [1991]. 
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Nonetheless this judicial saga pushed Ireland to negotiate a permanent protocol to pro-
tect its constitutional protection of the right to life of the unborn, and Protocol No 17 
was the European response to the Irish fears148. 
A similar path was followed by Denmark in respect to the case of the Danish Sec-
ond Home protocol. As a matter of fact, Protocol No 1 of the Treaty of Maastricht neu-
tralized every possible clash between the Danish legislation, prohibiting acquisitions of 
second homes in Denmark by non-Danish people and Community law. The protocol 
provided that “notwithstanding the provisions of this Treaty, Denmark may maintain 
the existing legislation on the acquisition of second homes”149, granting a permanent 
derogation from the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of citizenship. Three 
years earlier, in 1989, the ECJ held that restrictions applied by a Member State to na-
tionals of other Member States in regard to the acquisition and enjoyment of rights in 
immovable property are contrary to Community law150. 
Finally, Protocol No. 2 (the so-called-Barber Protocol) introduced a very specific 
and permanent derogation from the acquis communautaire151. It is not a coincidence 
that the Member States which pushed most to introduce the Protocol were those where 
the impact of a decision that the ECJ152 delivered some years earlier could have been fi-
nancially remarkable. 
These examples show that protocols have been used not only to accommodate 
disagreements on the participation of a Member State in an entire policy (such as the 
                                                   
148 As mentioned above, the Protocol was renewed and confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, and the 
same issue was object of reassurances in ‘the Guarantees’ after the Irish “No” in the referendum on ratifi-
cation. 
149 Treaty of Maastricht, Protocol (no 1) on the acquisition of property in Denmark. 
150 Case C-305/87, Commission v Greece [1989] and case C-186/87, Cowan v Trésor public 
[1989]. 
151 Protocol No 2 states that “for the purposes of Article 119 of this Treaty, benefits under occupa-
tional social security schemes shall not be considered as remuneration if and in so far as they are attribut-
able to periods of employment prior to 17 May 1990, except in the case of workers or those claiming under 
them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or introduced an equivalent claim under the 
applicable national law”. 
152 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group 
[1990]. 
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single currency, the free-border zone or the former third pillar), but also to address very 
specific concerns. The Grogan Protocol may be considered the only one with an evident 
connection with constitutional values. Nonetheless, the tailoring method adopted in the 
three cases is highly significant as a plausible mean of conflict neutralization. 
12. Opt-outs, declarations and legal guarantees, between political oppor-
tunism and sincere constitutional concerns 
As far back as 1984, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann drew a fundamental distinction in 
the analysis of flexibility arrangements in the (then) Community law. Ehlermann dis-
cerned between economic and social factors on one hand and “purely political phenom-
ena” on the other hand. According to his view, the former could in principle justify dif-
ferentiation, but not the latter. The author chooses but one example, which makes for 
extraordinarily telling 30 years later: “For instance, the fact that the British government 
(or the majority in Parliament or even public opinion in the United Kingdom) is op-
posed to joining the European monetary system would not be a valid argument for dif-
ferentiation”153. 
Almost 30 years later the UK did not join the third stage of the economic and 
monetary union, precisely because the British Government, the majority of the Parlia-
ment and the public opinion in the UK oppose the single currency. It may be that Eh-
lermann was right and the European Union was, so to say, wrong. In other words, it can 
be argued that the differentiation conceded to the UK was unjustified from the outset. 
Alternatively, it may be that it was Ehlermann to be mistaken, in the sense that what he 
identified as a purely political phenomenon (the UK opt-out from the single currency), 
in fact was not such a thing. In the second scenario we should reformulate his words, 
and assume that the fact that in one certain Member State the government, the majority 
in Parliament or even public opinion opposes a further step in the process of European 
integration should be held as a valid argument for differentiation. 
                                                   
153 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘How Flexible Is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Con-
cept of “Two Speeds”’ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1274, 1289. 
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What deserves special attention is the identification of what accounts for “purely 
political phenomena”. It is certainly true that special arrangements in favor of specific 
Member States are based on very different justifications. For our purposes it is highly 
significant to discern the diverse nature of the “valid argument for differentiation”. Be-
side socio-economic factors and “purely political phenomena”, I argue for the possible 
existence of more than valid constitutional arguments for differentiation. It may not be 
easy to discern between purely political arguments and constitutional reasons for differ-
entiation, especially in the case of the UK, where there is no formal document to look in-
to. Nonetheless the assumption that the British opt-out from the single currency is a 
purely political phenomenon is highly debatable. Were this opposition to the single cur-
rency a purely political phenomenon, 25 years of changing governments would have at 
some point led the UK in the opposite political direction. What would have happened is 
the same thing that happened when the UK opted out of the social chapter. This opt-out 
was certainly based on a pure political phenomenon: as a matter of fact, in 1997 La-
bour’s victory in the general elections caused the overturning of the contingent decision 
to opt-out from the social charter. The UK opted back in. 
Nonetheless one could still argue that specific Member States, which were grant-
ed an opt-out on the basis of ‘purely political phenomena’, are impeded to opt back in 
even if governments and political preferences change, because some opt-outs become a 
totem in public opinion. In these cases Member States developed extensive experience 
in “circumventing” the opt-outs. If the structure of the specific opt-out is flexible enough 
to admit case-by-case opt-ins, Member States extensively used opt-ins to erode their 
non-participation in the policy areas in question. The UK has been a champion in “get-
ting the best of both worlds”154: with regard to the opt-out from the former third pillar, 
                                                   
154 It was the then Prime Minister Tony Blair who affirmed on October 25th 2004 that “There is no 
question of Britain giving up our veto on our border controls. In the Treaty of Amsterdam seven years ago 
we secured the absolute right to opt in to any of the asylum and immigration provisions that we wanted to 
in Europe. Unless we opt in, we are not affected by it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both 
worlds. We are not obliged to have any of the European rules here, but where we decide in a particular ar-
ea, for example to halt the trafficking in people, for example to make sure that there are proper re-
  56  
for example, the UK opted into most civil law measures, asylum matters and measures 
on illegal immigration. When the opt-out is rigid and does not allow for “picking and 
choosing” strategy, internal legislation mimicking EU regulations or parallel intergov-
ernmental agreements have been widely used to void opt-outs in substance (see the 
Danish experience, para. 11.3). 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY BETWEEN COOPERATION, 
MISTRUST AND SUBSIDIARITY 
There is no question of Britain giving up our veto on our border controls. In the 
Treaty of Amsterdam seven years ago we secured the absolute right to opt in to any of 
the asylum and immigration provisions that we wanted to in Europe. Unless we opt in, 
we are not affected by it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both worlds. We 
are not obliged to have any of the European rules here, but where we decide in a 
particular area, for example to halt the trafficking in people, for example to make sure 
that there are proper restrictions on some of the European borders that end up affecting 
our country, it allows us to opt in and take part in these measure 
 
In the previous pages we tried to investigate differentiated integration as a mean to neu-
tralize conflicts between EU law and certain particular characters of a Member State’s 
national constitutional identity. This approach revealed unexplored aspects of both the 
concept of national constitutional identity and of differentiated integration. The latter 
seems to be able to play a role as a method of “self-enforcement”155 of the identity clause. 
Nevertheless, differentiated integration is one of possible methods of “self-
enforcement”, or to be more exact, of non-judicial enforcement of the identity clause. In 
the present section we will investigate three further alternatives: the rule of unanimity 
                                                                                                                                                                    
strictions on some of the European borders that end up affecting our country, it allows us to opt in and 
take part in these measures”. On “getting the best” British attitude, see Andrew Geddes, ‘Getting the Best 
of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU and Migration Policy’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 723. 
155 This terminology is excerpted from Cloots (n 5) 39 ff. 
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as a safeguard of Member States’ interests in identity-sensitive policy areas; enhanced 
cooperation as a way out of political deadlocks when identity-related interests of certain 
Member States are at stake; the principle of subsidiarity as a privileged forum to investi-
gate the understanding of national constitutional identity by non-judicial national play-
ers. 
13. Unanimity: a clue of constitutional identity-sensitive matters 
The increasing application of majority voting has widely been considered one of 
the indicators of successful European integration. Starting from the Single European Act 
(1986), a set of reforms gradually extended the field of qualified majority voting (QMV) 
within the Council of ministers. Lately, the Treaty of Lisbon extended further the appli-
cation of the qualified majority voting. Against the background of these developments, 
the rule of unanimity voting has been held as an obstacle to the desirable target of an ef-
ficient decisional process. The rule of unanimity implies rigidity and it has been consid-
ered as an expression of mutual mistrust between Member States. With regard to consti-
tutional identity, one should take into account this “mistrust argument”. It is in fact 
plausible that Member States can likely be very reluctant to extend the majority voting 
to fields that are, even if only indirectly, sensitive with regard to their constitutional 
identities. In these circumstances, unanimity – as an expression of Member States’ mis-
trust to each other – should be considered only as a clue to identify possible constitu-
tional identity-sensitive area, in so far as the Member States have considered keeping 
control of the decisions taken by the Council in these fields. 
Even though the Lisbon Treaty extended the QMV further, unanimity is still re-
quired for many important decisions156, for example in several institutional matters157, 
where Member States agreed to govern unanimously on the development of European 
institutions. Some of the decisions subject to the unanimity rule are so crucial that it is 
                                                   
156 See Piris (n 96). 
157 Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University 
Press 2010). 
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hardly surprising to find them in the list: this is valid for the accession of new members 
in the European club (Art. 49 TEU), for the Accession of the EU to the ECHR (Art. 6(2) 
TUE and Art 218(8) TFEU) and for the authorization to proceed with enhanced coop-
eration (Art. 329(3) TFEU). To some extent a similar justification lies behind the appli-
cation of unanimity voting for the adoption of a multiannual financial framework (Art. 
312(2) TFEU) and for decisions laying down the provisions relating to the system of the 
Union’s own resources (Art. 311(3) TFEU). Unanimity applies to those decisions that 
may affect the equality of Member States in the European institutions (composition of 
the European Parliament, Art. 14(2) TEU), with a special regard to important symbols 
(the seat of the EU institutions, Art. 341 TFUE) and the use of languages in the institu-
tions (Art. 342 TFEU). In the list of institutional matters subject to unanimity voting, we 
find decisions that proved to be possibly problematic, such as the use of the flexibility 
clause (Art. 352 TFEU), and the conferral of jurisdiction on the CJEU in certain disputes 
related to European intellectual property rights (Art. 262 TFEU). 
The most interesting suggestions come from the persistent application of una-
nimity in substantive matters. A common unanimous agreement in the Council is still 
required for: any decision taken under the chapter on the common foreign and security 
policy (Art. 31 TUE) and the common security and defense policy (Art. 42(2) TEU); the 
conclusion of certain types of international agreements; the negotiation and conclusion 
of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, as well as foreign direct investment (Art. 207(4) TFEU); any decision concern-
ing direct or indirect taxes (Art. 113, 192(2)(a), 194(3) TFEU); most of the measures 
concerning social security, specifically social security and social protection of workers, 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, representation 
and collective defense of the interests of workers and employers, and conditions of em-
ployment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory (Art. 153(2) 3rd 
subparagraph); any provision strengthening or adding to the list of European citizen-
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ship’s rights158 (Art. 25 TFEU); actions to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Art. 19(1) TFEU); 
provisions primarily of fiscal nature (Art. 192(2)(a)); some measures in the field of pro-
tection of the environment159 and measures significantly affecting a Member State's 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply 
(Art. 192(2)(c)); measures concerning family law with cross-border implications (Art. 
81(3) and (4)); any decision identifying aspects of criminal procedure not expressly 
listed in the Treaties that may be the legal basis to adopt directives facilitating mutual 
recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters having a cross-border dimension (Art. 82(3)); the establishment of a 
European public prosecutor (Art. 86(1) TFEU); measures concerning operational coop-
eration between Members states’ police, customs and other specialized law enforcement 
services (Art. 87 (3)); provisions laying down the conditions and limitations under 
which the Member States’ competent authorities (judiciary, police, custom, and other 
                                                   
158 According to Art. 20(2) TFEU, citizens of the Union “shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;  (b) the right to vote and to stand as candi-
dates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of resi-
dence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third 
country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that 
State; (d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to 
address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a 
reply in the same language”. In this respect, empirical evidence of the national concerns may already be 
found in the Danish positions with regard to the Maastricht Treaty. Following the first Danish rejection of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, the so-called Edinburgh Agreement granted Denmark four exceptions. Section A 
of the ‘Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning certain prob-
lems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union’ stated that the provisions of part two of the EC 
Treaty (Citizenship of the Union’) “do not in any way take the place of national citizenship. The question 
whether an individual possesses the nationality of A Member State will be settled solely by reference to 
the national law of the Member State concerned”. This position was reaffirmed in the ‘Unilateral declara-
tions of Denmark’. With regard to the adoption of any provision to strengthen or to add EU citizens’ 
rights, the Declaration stated that “[i]n Denmark, such adoption will, in the case of a transfer or sover-
eignty, as defined in the Danish Constitution, require either a majority of 5/6 of Members of the Folketing 
or both a majority of the Members of the Folketing and a majority of voters in a referendum”. Both decla-
rations are attached at the Conclusion of the Presidency of the European Council, 11-12 December 1992, 
and available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/default_en.htm.  
159 In accordance with Article 192(2)(b), unanimity is required for measures affecting town and 
country planning, quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the 
availability of those resources, land use, with the exception of waste management. 
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specialized law enforcement services) may operate in the territory of another Member 
State in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of that State; provisions concern-
ing passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document (Art. 77(3)). 
It is not hard to identify some leit-motiv in the substantive matters where una-
nimity is still required, and therefore a higher degree of mutual mistrust between Mem-
ber States still persists. The rule of unanimity still expresses prudence and caution in 
matters that are traditionally located in the core of State sovereign powers: a) foreign af-
fairs and internal defense and security b) taxation c) criminal law and procedure, in-
cluding matters related to the monopoly of use of force and law enforcement; d) citizen-
ships’ rights and provisions directly or indirectly connected with the status of citizen. 
Beside these areas, which are traditionally linked to essential State sovereign 
powers, the list of matters where unanimity is still required bears a list of matters that 
are expression of the fundamental social dimension of the postwar constitutional state, 
namely social security and non-discrimination. Finally, unanimity is required in possi-
bly ethically sensitive matters like family law, some aspects related to protection of the 
environment and energetic policies and certain aspects in the field of property rights.  
In the framework of social security matters, the unanimity required by Article 
154(2) 3rd subparagraph is not the only point worthy of attention: according to Art. 
153(4) TFEU, provisions unanimously adopted in the field of social security “shall not 
affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social se-
curity systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof”. Final-
ly, a twofold guarantee is provided also in regard to the addition of new rights for EU 
citizens. In this matter, not only unanimity is required, but the TEU also states that any 
provision unanimously adopted, strengthening or adding new rights for EU citizens, 
shall enter into force after the “approval by the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements” (Art. 25(2) TFEU). 
Therefore, it could be argued that unanimity may serve as an indicator of consti-
tutional identity-sensitive matters, which are better kept under unanimous control by 
Member States. Nevertheless, on one hand this does not mean that every area where 
unanimity is still being applied indicates a constitutional identity-sensitive matter. 
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Member States can decide to apply unanimity for a variety of reasons, regardless of any 
constitutional identity-related concern. On the other hand, unanimity cannot be consid-
ered as an ultimate guarantee of respect of Member States’ constitutional identity, or as 
an exclusive indicator of constitutional identity-sensitive fields. Indeed, an automatic 
protection of constitutional identity through the mere application of the rule of unanim-
ity may be excluded in two alternative scenarios: a) the Council could unanimously 
adopt a decision violating the constitutional identity of a Member State or b) constitu-
tional identity could be violated in one of the fields where QMV applies. 
14. Enhanced cooperation: dribbling through national concerns? 
Enhanced cooperation (EnC) is another fragment of the European mosaic that, in 
particular after 1992, consisted of an overall tension between a centripetal force of deep-
er supranational integration and a centrifugal national backlash. In short, enhanced co-
operation is an institutional arrangement that makes possible for a certain number of 
Member States – but not all of them – to integrate further their policies within the EU. 
EnC has been thought of as a tool to overcome political deadlocks: under certain condi-
tions, Member States that agree on a project of further integration may not be blocked 
by the substantial veto of Member States that do not agree. These certain conditions 
have been changing under successive Treaty amendments, from the introduction of the 
first set of rules in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to the regulatory framework provided by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, currently in force.  
According to the discipline currently in force, EnC may be established in all sec-
tors that do not fall within the EU’s exclusive competence and the common foreign and 
security policy. At least nine Member States are entitled to submit a request to the 
Commission, and the Commission may submit a proposal to the Council. The latter has 
the power to authorize proceeding with the proposal by Qualified Majority Voting, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. A slightly different procedure applies 
within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. Leaving aside proce-
dural details, EnC is based on two main pillars: the principle of transparency and the 
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principle of openness. The former requires that all Member States’ representatives are 
authorized to sit in the Council meetings where deliberations on enhanced cooperation 
shall be adopted. Member States’ representatives that are not part of the relevant EnC 
are simply not entitled to the right to vote in those matters. 
The principle of openness is implemented by Art. 331 TFEU, providing conditions 
for third parties to subsequently join established cooperation agreements. Significantly, 
the competent authority on third party’s application is the Commission and not the orig-
inal member of the enhanced cooperation, with a sort of “appeal” to the Council, in case 
of a rejection by the Commission. 
EnC has initially been seen suspiciously: the Treaty of Amsterdam provided very 
strict rules160 that have likely been the reason why the (then) closer (now enhanced) co-
operation provisions have never applied. Rules have been progressively softened, but 
traces of the original caution toward EnC are still present in the current set of regula-
tions. The Treaties spell out very clearly that EnC may be adopted only as a last resort 
and that it may not lead to a deviation in the integration process in the EU, but shall ra-
ther “further the objectives of the Union, protect its interest and reinforce its integration 
process” (Art. 20, Par. 1, TEU). Furthermore, Art. 326 TFEU states that EnC “shall com-
ply with the Treaties and Union law” and “shall not undermine the internal market or 
economic, social and territorial cohesion” nor shall it “constitute a barrier to or discrim-
ination in trade between Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them”. 
Despite this permanent subtle mistrust of EnC, the new – and less complicated – 
set of procedural rules introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon finally led to the first con-
crete experiences of EnC. In 2012 and 2013 respectively enhanced cooperation agree-
ments on divorce law and on unitary patent entered into force. It would be too much a 
digression to focus on the details of these agreements161. It is enough to note that, in 
                                                   
160 This was, at least, the position of a significant part of the legal scholarship. Among many oth-
ers, see Claus Dieter Ehlermann, ‘Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-Operation: The New Provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 246, 269. 
161 For further details, among many others see Aude Fiorini, ‘Harmonizing the Law Applicable to 
Divorce and Legal Separation—Enhanced Cooperation as the Way Forward?’ (2010) 59 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1143; Steve Peers, ‘Divorce, European Style: The First Authorization of En-
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both cases, agreements followed a discussion of the projects at the European level, even 
though each agreement is a different story. In both cases, reasons for a comprehensive 
European regulation were self-evident: in the case of the EnC on divorce law, a signifi-
cant and constantly increasing number of nationally mixed families162; in the case of the 
EnC on Unitary Patent, the high cost of the pre-existing system of inventions’ protec-
tion163. Nonetheless harsh disagreements on the policy to adopt on these issues emerged 
soon. In the case of a European regulation on family law the disagreement had many 
facets, and was based on very different approaches, traditions, and domestic regulations 
in the matter of family law. A first proposal for a Council regulation was issued by the 
Commission in 2006. Firstly, the proposal encountered the opt-out of Denmark and the 
decision of the UK and Ireland not to participate in the measure. Secondly, the discus-
sion of the single policies made clear the remarkable variations of position of Member 
States on the matter. The proposal had been presented on a table where at opposite ends 
were sitting representatives of States where divorce was prohibited (Malta) or very re-
strictively regulated (Poland) and other Nordic States where regulations were inspired 
to much more liberal views. It has been reported that Sweden was primarily responsible 
for the collapse of the negotiations, not being available to apply foreign divorce rules 
that would possibly be much less liberal than the domestic regulations164.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
hanced Cooperation’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 339; Enrico Bonadio, ‘The 
EU Embraces Enhanced Cooperation in Patent Matters: Towards a Unitary Patent Protection System’ 
(2011) 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 416. 
162 On this trend, among many others, see Giampaolo Lanzieri, ‘Mixed Marriages in Europe, 1990-
2010’ in Kim Doo-Sub (ed), Mixed marriages in Europe, 1990-2010 (2012).  
163 The system of European Patent of the European Patent Office, established by the European Pa-
tent Convention in 1973, consists of a mere sum of the individual countries’ patents, requiring the valida-
tion in every single European country. This process is long and expansive, most of all because of transla-
tion costs. In compared with the US patent system, “it has been estimated that protecting an invention us-
ing the current EPO procedure in all twenty-seven EU Member States would cost applicants roughly 
€32,000, of which €23,000 would be incurred for translation fees alone. On the other hand, a US patent 
costs €1,850 on average”: see Bonadio (n 162) 416. 
164 Fiorini (n 162) 1144. 
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With regard to the project of a European Patent with unitary effect165, the disa-
greement did not break out on decisions on substantive policies, but on the language 
prerequisite. A common EU regulation establishing a Community patent had been pro-
posed in 2000. In the following years, political hurdles and never-ending amendments 
to the Treaties’ provisions on the legal basis made a decision on the proposal impossible. 
The discussion was re-launched in 2008-2009 and after the adoption of the Treaty of 
Lisbon166 the Council reached an agreement on a revised text of the EU patent regula-
tion, providing terms and conditions for obtaining a unitary patent right and its legal ef-
fects. Provisions on the delicate issue of translation –where unanimity was required in 
the Council– had been left aside from this agreement and were finally proposed by the 
Commission in June 2010. The model was linguistically inspired by the EPO system: EU 
patent claims would have to be only translated into one of the three EPO’s languages167. 
On this proposal, where unanimity was needed, Spain and Italy objected with a firm op-
position, due to concerns about the status of the Spanish and Italian language. This 
deadlock was challenged by many Member States, which soon suggested proceeding 
without Italy and Spain. The Commission proposed an EnC agreement, shortly after-
ward approved by the Council. All Member States except Italy and Spain168 agreed to 
participate in this EnC.  
                                                   
165 Before the EnC adoption, the EU has been attempting to innovate on this field for several dec-
ades. For an overview of that background, see Steve Peers, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the EU Pa-
tent’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 229. 
166 The Treaty of Lisbon conferred the Union explicit power “to establish measures for the creation 
of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights 
throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralized Union-wide authorization, co-ordination and 
supervision arrangements” (Art. 118 TFEU). The delicate language issue was addressed in a specific para-
graph, as long as Art. 118, para. 2, provides that any rules to “establish language arrangements for the Eu-
ropean intellectual property rights’ must be adopted by a form of ‘special legislative procedure’”, requiring 
unanimity in the Council and the consultation of the European Parliament. 
167 More precisely, according the Commission’s proposal applications not filed in English should 
have been translated into one of the other two languages. During a transitional period of maximum 12 
years, patents filed in French or German should have been translated into English, and patent applica-
tions submitted in English should have been translated into any official language of the participating 
Member State that is an EU official language. 
168 Italy and Spain’s opposition also found a judicial follow-up. These States submitted several 
complaints to the CJEU, challenging the authorization of EnC and the subsequent measures implement-
ing it. All complaints have been by far dismissed by the Court: see Case C-1274/11, Kingdom of Spain v 
Council of the European Union [2013]; Case C-295/11, Italian Republic v Council of the European Union 
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These first experiences in the field of divorce law and European patent, show that 
EnC is a flexible mechanism in the EU architecture, and it may be capable of playing dif-
ferent and changing roles. It may not be excluded that its application aims also at enact-
ing a further step in the integration process excluding one or more Member States, neu-
tralizing possible conflicts with the domestic legal order. EnC usually stems out from EU 
projects that initially comprised all Member States, and that found strong opposition 
from a few Member States, expressing concerns that are not shared by other Member 
States. These concerns may be related to national features, constitutional values and 
other elements that can be easily traced back to the constitutional identity of Member 
States not participating in the EnC. Experience garnered from the first two examples of 
EnC lead to subject matters that are usually reconnected with national constitutional 
identity, namely family law and the protection of national language. 
 
15. Subsidiarity 
As previously mentioned, differentiated integration has always existed as a legal 
tool, by being able to accommodate special national interest in the European integration 
process. Nonetheless, the Treaty of Maastricht offers good reasons to be considered as a 
turning-point in this respect. A considerable widening of the EU competences has been 
balanced not only with the introduction of the principle of respect of national identities, 
but also – and perhaps more significantly – with the principle of subsidiarity. This tri-
angle – European integration, national identity and subsidiarity – may be reasonably 
considered as a unique picture, carrying a new alternative to the sovereignty narrative in 
the European Union169. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
[2013]; Case C-146/13, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union [2015]; Case C-
147/13, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union [2015] 
169 See Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro Llivinia, ‘Introduction’ in Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro Llivinia (n 
27). 
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Since its introduction in Treaties, subsidiarity has always been a fundamental 
principle of EU law. It emerges in another normative triangle picture in Art. 5 TEU, be-
sides the principle of conferral and the principle of proportionality. In the current for-
mulation, subsidiarity applies in areas of non-exclusive EU competence and implies that 
“the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be bet-
ter achieved at Union level” (Art. 5(3) TEU). 
The principle of subsidiarity has been mostly read as a “competence valve”, de-
termining when the EU is competent to legislate, and aiming at displacing the regulation 
power as closely as possible to the citizen. Nonetheless subsidiarity bears an extraordi-
nary potential with regard to national constitutional identities. In this respect, recent 
studies have emphasized the versatile role that the principle of subsidiarity may play in 
the European Union, and some of them focused on the possible link between the im-
plementation of the principle and the legal duty to respect national identities170. This re-
interpretation revealed interesting aspects of subsidiarity, and enlightened its possible 
application as a non-judicial way to express concerns related to constitutional identity. 
Indeed the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity defines the implementation of the principle and introduces several mechanisms to 
control and monitor its application. The Protocol was firstly attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and successively amended by the Lisbon Treaty. The latter innovated these 
mechanisms and strengthened the role of national Parliaments, which have the right to 
                                                   
170 See Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Coupling National Identity with Subsidiarity Concerns in National 
Parliaments’ Reasoned Opinions’ (2014) 21 Maastricht journal of European and comparative law 320; Ni-
cola Lupo, ‘Subsidiarity and National Parliaments. Rationale, Scope and Effects of the Early Warning Sys-
tem’ in Marta Cartabia, Nicola Lupo and Andrea Simoncini (eds), Democracy and subsidiarity in the Eu: 
National parliaments, regions and civil society in the decision-making process (il Mulino 2013); Marco 
Goldoni, ‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 90. An unpredicted and unexpected flexibility 
of the Principle of Subsidiarity and its implementation through the EWS had already been proved by 
Philipp Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and 
Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012).  
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police subsidiarity through the so-called “Early Warning System” (EWS)171. By virtue of 
the procedure provided by the Subsidiarity Protocol, national Parliaments may send to 
the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned 
opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the sub-
sidiarity principle.  
If a “qualified minority” of the Member State’s Parliaments acting together is 
met172, a legislative draft proposed by the Commission may be temporary stopped by 
means of a so-called “yellow” or “orange card”. National Parliaments have only carded 
twice so far, even though many reasoned opinions have been raised. In a few words, the 
experience of the EWS still seems to be open to a variety of purposes, and it may not be 
excluded that national Parliaments will use subsidiarity to raise concerns related with 
their constitutional identities. Some empirical evidence has already been proven in the 
above mentioned study. 
Explicit references to Art. 4(2) TEU may be found in the Austrian Parliament’s 
reasoned opinion on the Commission proposal on the award of concession contracts. 
The Commission initiative was based on Art. 114 TFEU, enabling the adoption of har-
monization measures to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Since the draft 
directive was also related to services of general economic interest, the Austrian Parlia-
ment evoked in its reasoned opinion a number of Treaty provisions – and Art. 4(2) was 
                                                   
171 On the role of national parliaments in the EWS see Katarzyna Granat, National Parliaments 
and the Policing of the Subsidiarity Principle (European University Institute 2014). With regard to the 
specific experience of the commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike, see Federico 
Fabbrini and Katarzyna Granat, ‘“Yellow Card, but No Foul”: The Role of the National Parliaments under 
the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’ 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 115. 
172 The qualified minority for a “yellow card” consists of one third of the votes (a quarter in the ar-
ea of justice and home affairs). An “orange card” is raised when more than a half of the national Parlia-
ments oppose a legislative draft on grounds of subsidiarity. In the first case the Commission may decide to 
maintain, amend or withdraw the legislative draft, being only obliged to motivate its decision. In case of 
the “orange card” the draft legislation must be reviewed and in case the Commission decides to maintain 
its proposal, it has to justify its decision with a reasoned opinion. The Council, by a majority of 55 per cent 
of its members, and the European Parliament shall decide on the basis of the Commission’s reasoned 
opinion whether or not to adopt the act. The threshold is calculated taking into account the fact that each 
Parliament has two votes, and one vote is accorded to each chamber in the 13 bicameral Parliament 
States. 
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one of these – to emphasize the risk of a compression of the flexibility granted to the 
Member States in the area of services of general economic interest173. 
Similar concerns were expressed in the reasoned opinion delivered by the Ger-
man Bundesrat on the same proposal of the Commission. The Bundesrat specially un-
derlined the need of safeguarding local self-government when regulating the award of 
service connection, with an explicit reference to Art. 4(2) TEU174. 
With respect to the proposal for a directive on the award of concession contracts, 
the two mentioned reasoned opinions seem to interpret the flexibility clause in Art. 4(2) 
TEU as a safeguard of national autonomy175. Conversely, two reasoned opinions deliv-
ered by the Dutch and Swedish Parliaments on the Commission’s proposal on the decree 
for the purpose of providing common rules regarding the temporary reintroduction of 
border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances refer to Art. 4(2) in a 
much vaguer sense. These opinions interpret the identity clause as a provision protect-
ing national competences such as national security. The Dutch Parliament referred to 
Art. 4(2) in connection with other provisions of TEU and TFEU, with the aim of chal-
lenging the legal basis of the Commission proposal176. Similarly, the Swedish Parliament 
assumed that the Commission’s proposal of providing new rules regarding the tempo-
rary reintroduction of border controls affected national security and the maintenance of 
law and order. In the view of the Swedish Parliament, these matters should remain un-
der the responsibility of each Member State, by virtue of Art. 72 TFEU and Art. 4(2) 
TEU.  
                                                   
173 Guastaferro (n 171) 329. 
174 “Durch den zum 1. Dezember 2009 in Kraft getretenen Vertrag von Lissabon ist der Spielraum 
der EU, eine allgemeine Regelung für Dienstleistungskonzessionen zu schaffen, die auch Kommunen be-
trifft, nochmals eingeschränkt worden. Denn die EU hat nach Artikel 4 Absatz 2 Satz 1 EUV die jeweilige 
nationale Identität der Mitgliedstaaten zu achten, die in ihren grundlegenden politischen und verfas-
sungsmäßigen Strukturen, einschließlich der regionalen und lokalen Selbstverwaltung, zum Ausdruck 
kommt”, see ‘Beschluss des Budesrates: Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und 
des Rates über die Konzessionsvergabe – COM(2011) 897, Ratsdok, 1896011, Drucksache 874/11, March 
2nd 2012’. 
175 Guastaferro (n 171) 332. 
176 See ‘Reasoned opinion (subsidiarity) on the Decree for the purpose of providing common rules 
regarding the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstanc-
es – COM(2011)560, November 8th 2001’, join reasoned opinion of the Dutch Senate and the House of 
Representatives.  
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In summary, national Parliaments started to use their power to have a say in the 
legislative process of the EU through the subsidiarity door177. In this respect some Par-
liaments made use of Art. 4(2) as a valid reason in support of identity-related concerns. 
 
E. FINAL REMARKS 
16. A court-centered perspective vs. Non-judicial neutralization of identi-
ty conflicts: remarkable overlaps 
As outlined in the introduction, a vast attention of the legal scholarship has been 
devoted to the analysis of constitutional identity: most of the literature adopted a court-
centric canon of interpretation, even though the judicial epiphanies of the notion are ex-
tremely rare at the EU law level (see para. 5 and 6), and often ambiguous in the case-law 
of the Member States’ constitutional courts (see para. 4). The combination of these two 
aspects – a shortage of judicial material and vagueness of the concept – has been the 
starting point to embark on a non-judicial investigation of constitutional identity. At the 
present stage of the analysis, it is time to reassemble the collected fragments of this 
highly controversial notion. Elements of the judicial understanding of constitutional 
identity were collected in Part I. In Part II an analysis of methods of non-judicial neu-
tralization of identity-related conflicts was undertaken. In Part III, I analyzed three pos-
sible indicators of constitutional identity sensitive matters: a) national interests under-
pinning the non-participation of certain Member States in enhanced cooperation 
agreements; b) matters where the unanimity rule still applies and c) references to con-
stitutional identity in the national Parliaments’ reasoned opinions.  
                                                   
177 Every national parliament is indeed “free to interpret the functions conferred upon it by EU 
law in the manner which it retain to be the most beneficial”, by virtue of the political nature of national 
parliaments. This being said, it comes as no surprise that the “the way in which the early warning mecha-
nism develops in each national parliament tends to be influenced, to some degree, by its national charac-
teristics, by it political and institutional culture […], by the configuration of the parliamentary groups and 
committees, as well as the influence of the parliamentary bureaucracy. All these elements can be easily 
traced back to the constitutional identity of each Member State”. Cf. Lupo (n 171) 127, 132. 
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If these fragments of the constitutional identity patchwork are put together, a 
surprisingly coherent framework emerges. By comparing the list of constitutional-
identity-sensitive matters that the BVerfG compiled in its Lissabon-Urteil with the sub-
stantive matters involved in the illustrated opt-outs, exemptions and protocols remark-
able overlaps emerge. Member States and the EU are struggling widely on the same 
identical matters inside and out of European and national constitutional courts. Among 
the highly considered national interests many elements are recurring. Firstly, the deci-
sion of family law, which emerges in the Lissabon-Urteil list (see para. 4), in one of the 
enhanced cooperation agreements (see para. 14), in the Irish guarantees (see para. 11.2) 
and behind the Polish quasi-opt-out from the CFREU (see para. 11.4). Secondly, general 
consideration of the protection of the welfare state, emerging – again – in the Lissabon-
Urteil, in the decision of the Polish Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty and in 
more than one reasoned opinion of the national Parliaments (see para. 15). Thirdly, the 
form of State, emerging in the CJEU’s case-law (see para. 5) and in a more specific dec-
lination, comprising local self-government, in one reasoned opinion of the German 
Budesrat (see para. 15). Fourthly, peculiar national concerns regarding foreign and mili-
tary policy underpin a part of the Irish guarantees (see para. 11.3) and of the Danish opt-
out from decisions with defense implications (not specifically addressed in this paper). 
Fifthly, among national constitutional identity concerns a recurrent element is the pro-
tection of the national language (see the CJEU’s case law on the point, para. 5 and 6 and 
the reasons behind the non-participation of Italy and Spain in the European Patent with 
Unitary Effect, para 18). Sixthly, fiscal autonomy emerges as part of constitutional iden-
tity in the Lissabon-Urteil list and in the Irish Protocol on the Lisbon Treaty (see para. 
11.3). Lastly, overlapping concerns may be found in the BVerfG inclusion among the 
constitutional-identity sensitive matters of fundamental decisions on substantive and 
formal criminal law and on the use of force by the police. The significant opt-outs in the 
field of the Area of freedom, security and justice confirm the inclination of certain 
Member States to retain the highest possible level of autonomy in these areas (see para. 
11.1 and 11.3). 
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Most of the matters that result sensitive to constitutional identity – little wonder 
– are comprised in the traditional understanding of essential State functions: the ability 
to shape the social conditions including family regulation, protection of the national 
language, form of the State, fiscal autonomy, defense and military policy, criminal law 
and monopoly of the use of force. Less obvious is the fact that greatly overlapping claims 
to retain a high grade of national autonomy have been managed in very different man-
ners throughout the last developments of the European integration. In some cases, they 
have been left open to a judicial struggle. In others, they have been managed through a 
previous political neutralization by means of opt-outs, protocols, declarations and other 
political guarantees.  
As the very first experience of judicial struggles on identity-related cases shows 
possible disastrous outcomes, whereas the accommodation of highly considered nation-
al interest through differentiated integration did not apparently result in the dissolution 
of the Union, a less timid use of the latter seems to be highly recommended. Indeed, the 
judicial monopoly of the interpretation of national constitutional identity issues did not 
clarify the notion of national constitutional identity and it seems not efficient in terms of 
avoiding dangerous outcomes either. The so-called judicial dialogue proved to be more a 
judicial fight than a dialogue. It seems highly unfit as a method of settlement of consti-
tutional ultimate disputes. Under these circumstances, other methods need to be devel-
oped, both conceptually and practically. I argue that differentiated integration is already 
one of the alternative methods and needs to be developed further. 
17. A legal duty of differentiation 
After 1992 the outbreak of identity issues in the European Union has been ac-
companied by a parallel growth of differentiated integration, both in theory and in prac-
tice. These two trends, I argue, should be seen as closely linked to each other. According 
to a coordinated view of identity and differentiated integration, Article 4(2) TEU may be 
interpreted in the sense that it establishes a legal duty for the EU and Member States to 
neutralize any possible conflict before it breaks out by using opt-outs, interpretative dec-
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laration, exemptions and any other suitable mean. The respect of national identities 
spelled out in Article 4(2) TEU includes a duty to differentiate as long as differentiation 
prevents a violation of constitutional identity. 
What if things go wrong? What if a differentiated integration would have success-
fully neutralized an infringement of a peculiar character of the constitutional identity of 
a Member States, but none of the actors entitled to negotiate such an arrangement act-
ed? In other words, if Art 4(2) imposes a legal duty to accommodate national constitu-
tional identity claims through differentiated integration arrangements, what is the cho-
sen sanction in case of any breach of this duty?  
It is highly implausible for the CJEU to impose the introduction of a mechanism 
of differentiated integration, even if the latter would solve the legal problem. Is Article 
4(2) providing a differentiation duty with no sanction? I think not. The point is that the 
sanction in question is not applicable by the CJEU or by any national constitutional 
court. In fact, an applicable sanction exists and namely consists of the accommodation 
of the disagreement outside of the European Union framework. If a strong resistance 
from a limited number of Member States impedes an agreement on a certain matter, 
and no tool of flexibility is put into effect to accommodate these reluctances in the EU 
framework, under certain circumstances a Member States avant-garde may go for a fur-
ther option: international law. 
This seems to be the picture that emerged with the so-called Fiscal Compact178: 
all of its parties are Member States of the EU; the only Member States that did not sign 
the Treaty were the UK and Czech Republic (Croatia was not a Member of the Union 
yet). The Stability Treaty introduced new stringent forms of budgetary surveillance in 
(and over) the current Euro zone, improving the monitoring, surveillance and coordina-
tion of economic policies and providing enforcement measures to correct excessive mac-
roeconomic imbalances. The procedures laid down in the Treaties involve a fundamen-
                                                   
178 Formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union, signed on 2 March 2012 by all Member States except for the Czech Republic and the United King-
dom. 
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tal role of the European institutions179. The Treaty sets some specific targets for the sig-
natory Countries, that in short may be summarized as follows: to achieve a balanced (or 
in surplus) budget, to avoid an excessive government deficit and to correct macroeco-
nomic imbalances. Even though the Stability Treaty provides rules on stability, coordi-
nation and governance in the economic and monetary union, its application extends to 
Members States which benefit from a permanent de jure opt-out (Denmark), a de facto 
opt-out (Sweden) and to “Member States with a derogation” (those are Member States 
that have not adopted the Euro yet, but are legally obliged to do so as soon as they meet 
the requirements)180.  
In summary, the Stability Treaty looks more like an EU Treaty with the opt-out of 
the UK and Czech Republic than an international agreement between most of the EU 
Member States181. With a significant difference: being an international treaty, it enjoys 
the protection from referendum that is usually granted to diplomatic acts182. And this is 
not a small difference, in particular after the referendum fear that followed the French 
and Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the Irish ‘No’ to the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008. This scenario supports once more the idea that the judicial monopoly on 
                                                   
179 Each part of the Treaty submits a stability program to ECOFIN and the Commission and sets a 
‘medium-term budgetary objective’ to be assessed by the Council. For a concise analysis of the Treaty in 
relation to the authentic enhanced cooperation model on one hand, and with the threat of disintegration 
on the other hand, see Carlo Maria Cantore and Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Asymmetry or Dis-Integration? A 
Few Considerations on the New “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union”’ (2013) 19 European public law 463. 
180 Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and Monetary Union, Art. 
14(5). “This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation, as defined in Article 139(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption, as referred to in Protocol 
(No 16) on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have 
ratified this Treaty, as from the date when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes ef-
fect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or 
part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty”. 
181 The so-called Fiscal Compact provides the obligation to codify the budget rule in national law 
‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise 
guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to’. This provision has been criticized as excessively intru-
sive in the national State constitutional autonomy, and its compatibility with the EU law principle of re-
spect of the national identity and constitutional structure of the EU Member States has been questioned 
by Cantore and Martinico (n 180) 464–465. 
182 Majone (n 94) 246, 247. 
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national constitutional identity through the myth of the so-called judicial dialogue is an 
unsuitable institutional arrangement. Moreover it draws a rather dangerous picture. 
These are sufficient reasons to argue in favor of a need to reform these inappropriate in-
stitutional arrangements. Such prospects for reform are far from being new in the Euro-
pean debate183. From the “Constitutional Council”184 to the “European Conflicts Tribu-
nal”185, there is a relevant common denominator in many of the reform proposals of the 
Union, namely the awareness of the present inadequacy of the given judicial system of 
resolution of “ultimate conflicts” between the supranational and the national level186.  
A promising starting point for any proposal should be the awareness that “not all 
legal problems can be solved legally”187. Conflicts related to constitutional identity cer-
tainly belong to the category of legal problems that will unlikely be solved legally. This 
being said, the proposed model of a European Conflicts Tribunal could have a successful 
impact not only with respect to conflicts between EU and Member State competences, 
but also with respect to national constitutional identity-related issues. Lindseth’s pro-
posal is based on the above mentioned MacCormick’s admonition: in a nutshell, the Tri-
bunal should be comprised of judges from supreme and constitutional courts and pre-
sided over by the president of the CJEU, having competence a) on norm control upon 
reference by a Member State or a EU institution and b) on conflicts of jurisdiction sub-
                                                   
183 The debate exploded at around the turn of the century. Among many others, see Franz C May-
er, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’ (2001) 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völker-
recht 577. 
184 Joseph HH Weiler and Ulrich R Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-
Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 411. also published in Joseph 
HH Weiler, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass’, The constitution 
of Europe: ‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays on European integration (Cambridge 
University Press 1999) 322–323. 
185 Lindseth (n 13) 726. 
186 As a matter of fact “the ECJ Is an EU institution and has often been depicted as a major engine 
of the European integration process. The Court might therefore be expected to be more receptive to inte-
gration-based arguments. Secondly it cannot be excluded that the Court may not feel very comfortable 
with certain identity-related arguments, especially if they are inspired by national aims which are not, as 
such, shared by the EU”: cf. Cloots (n 5) 211. 
187 Neil MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 
259, 265. 
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mitted by national courts or individual litigants, as long as all other available legal rem-
edies have been exhausted.  
As far as constitutional identity-related conflicts are concerned, the most promis-
ing aspect relies upon the proposed additional political safeguards, to be guaranteed to 
Member States dissatisfied with a ruling of the Conflicts Tribunal. In these cases the 
Tribunal should refer the matter to the European Council for consideration. As a last op-
tion, in case “the concerned Member State cannot negotiate a satisfactory political solu-
tion within the European Council, the Member State should then be allowed to opt out 
of the legislation”188. 
                                                   
188 Lindseth (n 13) 732. 
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